Naval Blockades and Seapower Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 1805-2005


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GOD AND THE BRITISH SOLDIER
Michael Snape
Naval Blockades
and Seapower
Edited by
Sarah C.M.Paine
NAVAL POLICY AND HISTORY
This new collection ofup-to-date essays by well-known scholars covers the
Naval Blockades and Seapower
CASS SERIES: NAVAL POLICY AND HISTORY
Series Editor: Geoffrey Till
ISSN13669478
This series consists primarily oforiginal manuscripts by research scholars in
the general area ofnaval policy and history, without national or chronolog-
ical limitations. It will from time to time also include collections of
important articles as well as reprints ofclassic works.
1Austro-Hungarian Naval Policy,
Milan N. Vego
2Far-Flung Lines
ofDonald Mackenzie Schurman
Edited by Keith Neilson and
Greg Kennedy
3Maritime Strategy and Continental
Wars
Rear Admiral Raja Menon
4The Royal Navy and German Naval
Disarmament, 19421947
5Naval Strategy and Operations in
Narrow Seas
Milan N. Vego
6The Pen and Ink Sailor
19Naval Mutinies ofthe 20th Century
An International Perspective
Edited by Christopher Bell and
20The Road to Oran
AngloFrench Naval Relations,
September 1939July 1940
David Brown
S.C.M. Paine
Naval Blockades and
Seapower
Strategies and Counter-Strategies,
First published 2006
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY10016
Routledge is an imprint ofthe Taylor & Francis Group
2006 Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine
To George W. Baer, for his dedication to the Naval War
Colleges use ofmaritime history to teach officers and
the general public about the U.S. Navys role in national
and international affairs.
Illustrations
Contributors
xiv
Foreword John Hattendorf
Acknowledgements
PART I
Blockades and Seapower1
1Introduction
BRUCE ELLEMAN AND S.C.M. PAINE
2Naval Blockade and International Law
WOLFF HEINTSCHEL VON HEINEGG
PART II
Blockades through World War II23
3Napoleons Continental Blockade: An Effective Substitute to
Naval Weakness?
SILVIA MARZAGALLI
4The Flawed British Blockade, 181215
WADE G. DUDLEY
5The Crimean War Blockade, 185456
ANDREW D. LAMBERT
6The Union Navys Blockade Reconsidered
DAVID G. SURDAM
7The First Sino-Japanese War: Japanese Destruction
8The Naval Blockade ofCuba during the
SpanishAmerican War
MARK L. HAYES
9World War I: The Blockade
PAUL G. HALPERN
10Japanese Naval Blockade ofChina in the Second
Sino-Japanese War, 193741
KEN-ICHI ARAKAWA
11Naval Blockade and Economic Warfare in the
European War, 193945
PART III
Blockades after World War II131
12The Nationalists Blockade ofthe PRC, 194958
BRUCE A. ELLEMAN
13A Failed Blockade? Air and Sea Power in Korea, 195053
MALCOLM MUIR JR.
14The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
JEFFREY G. BARLOW
PART IV
Contemporary Blockade Strategy237
21Technology and Naval Blockades
Figures
4.1Timeline for the War of181236
8.1Timeline for the SpanishAmerican War, 181882
13.1Timeline for the Korean War146
21.1Unmanned aircraft capable ofhigh-altitude
reconnaissance and surveillance operations247
3.1Napoleans Europe and the Continental Blockade24
4.1The War of1812:American theatre ofoperations34
5.1The Baltic Sea theatre ofoperations50
5.2The Black Sea theatre ofoperations53
6.1The Union Blockade ofthe Confederacy60
7.1The Sino-Japanese War, 1894570
8.1The Spanish-American War, 189880
9.1The North Sea92
10.1The Chinese theatre ofoperations104
11.1The North Atlantic theatre ofoperations118
12.1The Nationalists blockade ofthe PRC as ofJuly 1949132
13.1The Korean War144
Illustrations
6.2Value ofU.S. manufacturing production63
6.3Volume and value ofreceipts received at New Orleans
from the interior65
10.1Changes in the percentage and gross tonnage ofshipping
to and from China112
10.2Chinas trade figures after the Marco Polo Bridge incident113
21.1Distance ofthe horizon245
22.1Time251
22.2Space253
22.3Force255
22.4Goals257
22.5Enemy adaptation260
22.6Effectiveness263
Illustrations
Ken-ichi Arakawa
is an Associate Professor in the School ofDefense
Science at the National Defense Academy in Yokosuka, Japan. In 2003,
Contributors
is an Associate Professor in the Maritime History
Department at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies ofthe U.S. Naval
War College, and most recently author of
Modern Chinese Warfare,
(Routledge, 2001),
Wilson and China: A Revised History ofthe
(M.E. Sharpe, 2002), and co-editor with Chris Bell of
Germany, and was the 20034 Stockton Chair ofInternational Law at
the U.S. Naval War College. His chapter in the present volume origi-
nally appeared as Naval Blockadein the International Law Studies
Series, Volume 75,
International Law Across the Spectrum ofConflict:
Essays in Honour ofProfessor L.C. Green on the Occasion ofHis
Primacy
(Cambridge University Press, 2003). Current research interests
Foreword
commercial ports is one that exercises the highest power ofinjuring him
which command ofthe sea can give us. We choke the flow ofhis national
activity afloat in the same way that military occupation ofhis territory
chokes it ashore.
academic and comparative examination ofeighteen selected case studies
from maritime history used to illuminate a range ofconcepts and uses of
naval blockade, an important type ofnaval operation rarely analysed but
recently used by a number ofcountries and navies around the world.
This volumes contributors and editors have jointly worked to deepen
and widen modern understanding ofnaval blockades. Their work provides
the basis for the conclusions that Elleman and Paine have reached, which
We, the editors, would like to thank our contributors and the many others
who shared their insights and expertise. At the Naval War College we bene-
Juda, Wayne Rowe, and Bob Schnare for library assistance. For graphics, we
Acknowledgements
PART I
Blockades and Seapower
Naval blockades have historically been associated with the starvation
blockadeofWorld War I, and more recently with the danger surrounding
the Cuban Missile Crisis ofOctober 1962. Contrary to these highly publi-
cized blockades, many naval blockades have been conducted with little
fanfare, and relatively little public awareness. This does not mean that they
have been ineffective, however, and as a military tactic naval blockades have
time after time shown themselves to be one ofthe most efficient ways to
exert pressure on an opponent. While some blockades have been studied by
scholars capable ofplacing these events in their social, political, and naval
context, these authors have been the exception, not the rule. For this reason,
this book hopes to fill a major gap in the academic literature.
This volume will focus on how and why naval blockades are adopted and
conducted in both non-war and war-time conflicts. When re-examining
1Introduction
Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine*
surface ships to keep the blockade tight; perhaps in no other sphere ofmili-
tary activity have changes in technology had such an immediate and obvious
impact on naval tactics. Although almost all ofthe chapters in this volume
prove this point in one way or another, good examples include the more
dependable coal supplies ofthe U.S. Navy during the SpanishAmerican
War, just as the modern and hi-tech ships ofthe 1990s gave the coalition in
Iraq the leverage it needed to halt oil smuggling.
Wade Dudley challenges the prevailing scholarly opinion that this blockade
was highly effective, and instead discusses how the United States exited the
war with a larger merchant marine and greater exports than before the
conflict began. In particular, inadequate British interdiction gave the U.S.
government the time it needed to build and outfit many new vessels. After
the war, these technologically superior ships-of-the-line became the core for
a new and highly modern United States Navy.
Similar to the War of1812, the blockade during the Crimean War was a
naval affair, but this time conducted in two widely distant theaters: the Baltic
and the Black seas. However, as Andrew D. Lambert shows us, it remained a
comparatively short war and the blockading parties had the relatively
limited objectives ofdegrading Russias military capabilities, weakening the
states resources, and pushing the Russian Tsar to accept peace negotiations.
For the first time, steam power gave British and French warships the neces-
sary mobility and speed to be able to enforce a tight blockade, while more
The British blockade ofGermany during World War I was an undeclared
economic blockade that has gained general approbrium as a starvation
blockade.As Paul G. Halpern shows in his chapter, it took many years for
the blockade to have any effect in Germany at all, and only in late 1916 and
early 1917 was there even a noticeable impact on food prices. During this delay,
the allied countries ofSerbia, Rumania, and Russia were either overrun or
collapsed from within. But it cannot be denied that, in combination with
victory on the battlefield, the British blockade helped defeat Germany.
For Japan, World War II began in 1937 with the outbreak ofa full-scale
war in China. As Ken-ichi Arakawa shows, a Japanese naval blockade ofthe
Chinese coast remained pacificand so had difficulty halting neutral trade
with China. The Nationalists could also compensate for the blockade by
Four years later in China, the Nationalists tried to create a similar impact
by blockading the enormously long Chinese coast. As Bruce A. Elleman
shows, the Nationalist forces based on Taiwan made use ofChinas many
offshore islands to institute both a sea-, and later in the 1950s, an air-patrolled
destroying then. In the end, the very primitiveness ofthe North Korean
A protracted blockadewas the UN-mandated sanctions against Iraq
from 1990 to 2003. As James Goldrick explains, while this effort may have
been one ofthe longest blockades in history, it was also one ofthe most
successful, as shown by the rapid victory obtained by coalition forces in
2003 against an Iraqi conventional military force gradually degraded by
years ofblockade. Smuggling oil and bringing in weapons could really only
be achieved by sea, so the Iraqi government proved unable to make up for
the losses due to the blockade. While it took an enormous amount oftime
and effort, this case shows that a selective blockade conducted by a coopera-
negotiated resolutions short ofall-out unlimited war. As far as Western
democratic states are concerned, naval blockades may prove to be one ofthe
most valuable tools to motivate rogue states. As recently as 15 October 2004,
the official North Korean radio service virulently denounced planned
U.S.Japanese exercises to test the Proliferation Security Initiative as an
international blockadeintended to militarily oppress, blockade, and
crush our Republic.
Introduction
According to a widely accepted definition, a blockade is a belligerent oper-
ation to prevent vessels and/or aircraft ofall nations, enemy as well as
neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas
belonging to, occupied by, or under the control ofan enemy nation.
purpose ofestablishing a blockade is to deny the enemy the use ofenemy
and neutral vessels or aircraft to transport personnel and goods to or from
enemy territory.
Ifsolely aimed against the enemys economy, the legality
ofa blockade has to be judged in the light ofthe law ofeconomic warfare
and ofneutrality.
2Naval Blockade and
International Law
WolffHeintschel von Heinegg
not only during a breach ofblockade and subsequent pursuit, but also until
they reached their port ofdestination.
Despite Danish and Swedish resistance, which was partly successful in the
late seventeenth century, England and Holland did not give up their practice
offictitious blockades.
Moreover, England, especially in the eighteenth
century, maintained that the French and Spanish ports were blockaded by
the mere geographical situation ofthe English islands.
That practice, as
well as the stern application ofthe law ofcontraband, resulted in grave
restrictions on neutral merchant shipping. Therefore, affected states reacted
by means ofthe first armed neutrality.
In her famous declaration of28
February 1780, the Russian Czarina Katharine II claimed that blockades, in
maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast ofthe
enemy.
Thus, fictitious or paper blockades had become illegal.
It must be stressed, however, that the Paris Declaration fell behind the
rules agreed upon during the armed neutralities. In particular, it lacks a clear
definition ofwhat is to be understood by effective.On the other hand, an
obligation similar to that ofthe armed neutralities, according to which the
blockading warships must be stationed and sufficiently close,in view of
the introduction oftorpedo boats and the improvement ofcoastal artilleries,
would not have been feasible anyway.
the 1909 London Declaration can be summarized as follows.
A blockade,
in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, it must be maintained
by a force sufficient to prevent access to the enemy coastline (Article 2).
However, in view ofthe rapid development ofweapons technologies
(long distance artillery, submarines, military aircraft) and the necessary
modification ofnaval strategies and tactics, it soon became impossible to
observe the London Declaration. The traditional close blockade was
replaced by the long-distance blockade that by a simultaneous excessive
application ofthe doctrine ofcontinuous voyage in fact led to the barring
ofneutral ports and coasts.
Neutral trade was subjected to far-reaching control measures, some even
taken in their respective home ports. For instance, merchant vessels that did
not possess a navicert were either diverted or captured, even ifthey had not
approached blockaded coasts or ports. Moreover, the belligerents established
enemy propertyshall include goods belonging to any person in any
such territory.
7Proceeding under this Order may be taken in any Prize Court having
jurisdiction to which the Prize Court Rules, 1939, apply.
8For the purposes ofthis Order the words British portmean any port
within the jurisdiction ofany Prize Court to which the Prize Court
Rules, 1939, apply.
In view ofthat practice,
developments in the techniques ofnaval and
aerial warfare have turned the establishment and maintenance ofa naval
blockade in the traditional sense into a virtual impossibility. It would seem,
therefore, that the rules in the Declaration on blockade in time ofwar are
now mainly ofhistorical interest.
Some consider the British practice a contribution to the progressive devel-
opment ofthe international law on blockades.
Still others stress the fact
that the United Kingdom had justified its practice by reference to
reprisals.
Hence, they maintain, the London Declaration
has not been sub-
stantively derogated by that practice. They merely concede that the requirement
restricted to vessels; it may also be applied and enforced against aircraft.
In any event, a blockade must be applied impartially to the vessels ofall
states, including merchant ships flying the flag ofthe blockading power.
However, although neutral warships and military aircraft enjoy no positive
right ofaccess to blockaded areas, the belligerent imposing the blockade
may authorize their entry and exit.
Neutral vessels in distress should not
be prevented from entering and subsequently leaving a blockaded area.
According to the U.S. and the German manuals, a further exception
applies to neutral vessels (and aircraft) engaged in the carriage ofqualifying
reliefsupplies for the civilian population and the sick and wounded. Those
vessels should be authorized to pass through the blockade cordon (safe
passage).
The German manual and Canadian draft manual contain provi-
specification ofthe rights and duties, however, no general agreement exists.
Ofcourse, it is undisputed
that: (1) a blockade must be declared and that
to establish the contrary, even though only the former USSR raised protests
against it.
Despite the obvious perils posed by submarines and missiles to surface
warships, in most cases the presence ofat least one surface unit, for humani-
tarian reasons, remains an indispensable requirement for the legality ofa
an international armed conflict to tolerate belligerent measures can be justi-
fied only under strict conditions.
In the context ofblockade, one ofthese conditions is the principle of
effectiveness. That principle would be rendered meaningless ifbelligerents
were entitled to enforce a blockade at a far distance from the area in ques-
tion. As long as neutral merchant vessels are situated outside the range of
operations ofthe forces maintaining the blockade, and as long as they do
not carry contraband or act in a way that makes them liable to attack, the
freedoms ofnavigation and overflight supersede the belligerentsinterest in
a comprehensive prohibition ofimports to their respective enemies. Of
course, the practical consequences ofthis position are ofa solely secondary
nature. Ifa neutral merchant vessel is captured outside the range ofopera-
tion ofthe blockade forces because it in fact or presumably was destined
to a blockaded port, that violation ofthe law ofneutrality results in a duty
Moreover, even states not bound by Additional Protocol I recognize that
belligerents are under an obligation not to prohibit reliefconsignments in
case ofa naval blockade.
That obligation, which is also recognized in the
literature,
would be meaningless absent prohibition ofa so-called hunger
a blockade pursuant to Article 42 will not have to comply fully with the
principle ofeffectiveness.
It must, however, be realized that, in view ofthe lack ofUN armed forces
proper, a blockade ordered by the Security Council will always be main-
tained and enforced by the members ofthe United Nations and their
(national) armed forces. Those forces are bound by the rules and principles
ofthe maritime
that, according to the position taken here, has to
be considered an order ofnecessity.That legal order has to be conceived
ofas primarily formulating duties which, as a minimum, have to be
observed ifstates resort to the use ofarmed force.
In other words, the restrictions contained in the rules ofwar are, in prin-
ciple, the most that international law is ready to accept when states are
unwilling or unable to refrain from the use ofarmed force. This means that,
when ordered to maintain and enforce a blockade pursuant to Article 42,
they may only deviate from the rules ofblockade law described above if
PART II
Blockades Through
World War II
Map 3.1Napoleans Europe and the continental blockade
The French Wars opposing Great Britain from 1793 to 1815 are considered
the ultimate episode ofthe Second Hundred Years War.
This conflict
resulted in the decline ofFrench influence in the Atlantic, Americas, and
Asia, and the rise ofGreat Britain as the major maritime world power. The
French Wars were the longest conflict in this process, and their outcome was
decisive. For more than twenty years, belligerents fought worldwide on both
land and sea. Besides military and naval aspects, these wars also adopted
economic warfare and privateering against enemy trade.
The continental blockade decree, issued on 21 November 1806, aimed to
shut the continent to British manufactured goods and British trade.
Napoleon hoped to weaken Great Britain and to force it to accept peace.
The year before, Nelson at Trafalgar had put an end to Napoleons ambition
to exert control over maritime routes and trades. The continental blockade
was designed as a counter-offensive to British naval superiority. Historians
have questioned the validity ofthis plan, arguing that the British economy
depended more upon extra-European markets than on European ones.
3Napoleons Continental
An Effective Substitute to Naval
Weakness?
Silvia Marzagalli
British control. The British Navy and privateers could prevent the adversary
from importing strategic goods including food for the starving French
population in 1793 and limit profits, thus affecting the nations wealth.
Neutral trade was tolerated, although impediments increased over time.
continent, calling it a paperblockade. Napoleon recognized the right of
the enemy to shut a port effectively, by preventing merchant ships to enter or
to clear, but not to stop any kind oftrade over an unlimited period oftime
without systematically enforcing the measure. He also contested the trans-
formation ofnaval blockades, which were admitted internationally as a
military step to prevent the provisioning and the activity ofmilitary ports,
into an instrument ofcommercial war.
Spain had agreed to measures blockading British trade, and all major Italian
ports were either under direct French authority (Genoa, Leghorn), or belonged
to allied countries (Ancona, Naples, Venice, Trieste).
The decree ofFontainebleau on 13 October 1807, and the two decrees of
Milan of23 November and 17 December 1807, accentuated the offensive char-
acter ofNapoleons commercial policy. They ordered the seizure ofall
products and colonial goods that did not possess a certificate oforigin issued
by the French consul in the port ofembarkation. Ships and cargoes that
touched Great Britain, or were inspected by the British at sea, were to be seized
at their port ofarrival in France, with no regard to the flag ofthe vessel.
Again, Napoleon justified these measures as a reply to the British Order in
Council of11 and 18 November 1807, blockading all European ports which
did not admit British vessels in fact, all Europe except Sweden and
ordering all ships bound to these ports either to stop in England and pay a 25
percent
ad valorem
duty, or to buy a British license to trade.
French measures made neutral shipping to Europe virtually impossible. U.S.
President Jeffersons embargo in December 1807 largely recognized this state
ofaffairs. The sharp decrease in international shipping in 1808 and 1809 seri-
ously affected the economic survival ofbelligerents and neutral ports alike.
The hardening ofNapoleons laws against British trade was accompanied
with strong enforcement. Wherever interdictions seemed insufficient, he
intervened: Leghorn and Tuscany were annexed in 1808, as were Holland
Some historians consider this system ofnavigation licenses as a repeal of
the continental blockade, especially once French merchants were authorized
to ship directly to Great Britain.
A closer look at French policy, however,
shows that Napoleon was attempting to solve some ofthe blockade prob-
lems without touching the principle ofhis economic laws. Licenses forced
French merchants, for instance, to export the equivalent ofthe value ofthe
imports, and the introduction ofBritish manufactured goods into the Empire
was still forbidden. Napoleon did not give up his plan to weaken the British
economy through an economic war.
The evolution ofthe continental blockade in 18081810 had important
consequences, both internationally and within Frances imperial borders. The
annexation ofa large part ofEurope, and the direct intervention ofthe French
army, did not reassure Napoleons allies. Even ifthey willingly adopted the
blockade and the Trianon duties, they soon realized that Napoleons license
system greatly favored French ports above annexed and allied ones. From 1810
to 1813, for instance, Bordeaux obtained 181 licenses and 607 American
permits, whereas Hamburg merchants only received 68 and 5 respectively.
Moreover, Napoleons subjects hardly understood the burning ofBritish
October 1811 their wages from February to July. Under such circumstances,
they were susceptible to bribes: How can you prevent a custom officer
earning 40 francs a month [
] from refusing an offer of200 or 300 francs
goods they seized. This was a welcome source ofincome for badly paid civil
servants. But, as the chiefofpolice in Leghorn put it, on the one side in
order to benefit from smugglers [through bribes], on the other side to obtain
a part ofthe goods ofthose who do not find an agreement with them,
customs officers are and must be from the very nature ofthings the greatest
partisans offraud.
Existing legislation also allowed those arrested to avoid a trial by paying
a fine to the Customs bureau. Merchants organizing smuggling were, there-
fore, able to rescue their agents before the court enquired closely into their
organization. Despite the adoption ofstrong repressive measures, most of
the smugglers were neither tried nor sentenced. Because ofthe small quanti-
ties ofgoods they tried to introduce, and the evident poverty ofthe porters,
As a matter offact, merchants were rarely questioned about smuggling.
Some bought immunity by offering Napoleons senior civil servants an
interest in their profits. In 1811, for instance, Bordeaux authorities discovered
that a senior civil servant participated in a plan to discharge British manufac-
tured goods on the coast ofsouth-western France.
More generally,
however, merchants owed their impunity to the very essence ofNapoleons
regime. The regime rested on the support ofthe
notables
, those wealthy
landowners who exerted authority in the cities. It was from among these
notables
that the regime chose its municipal and departmental representa-
tives. Tax lists served as a basis ofidentifying local
notables
Neutral ship-
ping, therefore, increased enormously. According to their capacity for
maintaining their neutral status, the United States, Denmark, the Hanseatic
ports, several German towns and principalities (Kniphausen, Oldenburg,
Papenburg), or Ragusa (Dubrovnik) in the Mediterranean, played at some
moments a vital role in maintaining active shipping.
In many cases, these
neutrals also conducted business on the belligerentsaccount.
Neutral shipping allowed French merchants to carry on indirectly their
former trade with French colonies, but neutrals also threatened Napoleons
Napoleons Continental Blockade
plan to ban British goods from the Empire. He therefore required that all
imported goods be accompanied by a certificate oforigin signed by the
French consul in the port ofembarkation. Had this measure been effective,
no British wares could arrive in France even after calling at a neutral port.
Luckily enough for merchants, however, consuls and French authorities
generally accepted bribes to sign fraudulent certificates. Louis-Antoine
The War of1812,American theatre ofoperations
Scholarly debates on the underlying causes ofthe War of1812 have been
contentious, but historians tend to agree that the British naval blockade of
the United States proved extremely effective. One even stated that the over-
whelming naval pressure the British were able to exert along the whole
length ofthe American Atlantic coast wiped out American seaborne traffic
and communications and gradually inclined the government in Washington
to become more disposed to peace.
4The Flawed British Blockade,
Wade G. Dudley
The capability ofmaintaining long-term naval blockades appeared late in
the age ofsail. The coppering ofship bottoms, mandated for the Royal Navy
only near the end ofthe American Revolution, dramatically extended time
Figure 4.1
Time line ofthe war of1812
years at sea. Thus, only by the last decade ofthe 1700s could a naval
blockade be effectively maintained for more than a very few months.
France declared war on Great Britain on 1 February 1793. On the high
seas, French naval squadrons and individual raiders tried to destroy Britains
merchant marine, the largest in the world. Unless contained or destroyed, these
squadrons could seize Britains rich West Indian sugar colonies, or eliminate
its influence in Asia. Worse, should France gain support from the Spanish
the American coast and protect American vessels. Some 165 gunboats,
mounting two or three cannon each, along with numerous coastal fortifica-
tions provided coastal defense. Unfortunately, only 62 ofthe gunboats
proved seaworthy while most ofthe coastal fortifications were unusable.
remain concentrated, therefore, may have been correct at the time, but it
delayed a rapid blockade ofAmerican ports. Dozens ofmerchantmen safely
returned home, while warships and privateers ventured forth virtually unmo-
lested to attack British shipping. Unfortunately for Sawyer, the navies never
six frigates, and six sloops. In Britain, the stinging naval losses brought an
end to diplomatic efforts to end the war.
By the end of1812, the Royal Navy had lost nine warships to enemy
action and ten to natural causes, as opposed to only five small warships lost
by the U.S. Navy. The British also had taken only 100 American ships as
prizes and recaptured some fifty merchantmen, as opposed to over 360
captured by Americans.
The failure to establish a rapid blockade ofmajor
American ports, coupled with an incorrect estimate ofAmerican naval capa-
bility, cost Britain heavily during the opening months ofthe war.
Blockade or Concentration?
By January 1813, Warrens situation seemed well-nigh impossible. Though
Admiralty numbers indicated that he commanded some 97 warships, only
twenty-eight were based at Halifax or Bermuda and only six ofthose could
be spared for actual blockade duty.
Because a blockade ofthe almost 2,000
miles ofAmerican coastline, or at the least its major ports, had not been
established in June 1812, the U.S. Navy as well as dozens ofprivateers sailed
at will. This, in turn, forced many potential British blockaders to function as
convoy escorts and roving patrols. As the conflict intensified and spread, the
drain ofships from the blockade ofFrance increased. For the first time
since 1805 and Nelsons victory at Trafalgar, the Admiralty found itselfin
the position ofconstantly reacting to enemy naval forces.
destroy the U.S. Navy. Finally, the squadron ofblockaders already assem-
bled at the mouth ofthe bay could begin immediately to lay the groundwork
for the campaign.
On 1 April 1813, Warren and his subordinate, Admiral Sir George
Cockburn, led over fifty warships to the Chesapeake. British sailors and
marines captured one small warship, several privateers, and numerous
fishing boats and small coasting vessels while severely damaging the regions
infrastructure. Warren dispatched Cockburn and a small force to raid the
coastal waters ofNorth Carolina, an event that frightened the populace but
least 435 merchantmen. To this list could be added over 70 ships severely
damaged throughout the North American theater by storms. Meanwhile,
British forces had taken or recaptured an estimated 400 merchantmen and
privateers, mostly vessels ofthirty tons or less from the Chesapeake Bay.
In hindsight, Warrens decision to concentrate his forces rather than
tighten the blockade failed. And the Admiralty, though it had certainly
pushed the admiral in that direction, had little tolerance for failure. Warren
would be replaced in 1814. Meanwhile, when peace negotiations deadlocked,
the British naval blockade continued.
181415: A Most Destructive War
An observer ofthe American coast in the opening months of1814 would
have been amazed at the apparent success ofthe British blockade.
This meant the immediate demobilization ofmany ships in the Royal
Navy. Rather than sail for the Americas, ship after ship discharged its crew
after time under the onslaught ofAmerican warships. Those warships, once
free ofthe blockade, operated in all the waters ofthe world, taking prizes
5The Crimean War Blockade:
Andrew D. Lambert
limited maritime interests, while Britains and Frances overwhelming naval
strength and steam-powered warships allowed an effective close blockade
to adopt a common policy with France to avoid stopping and searching
neutral shipping on the open seas, which might antagonize key neutrals.
Denmark and Sweden controlled strategic access to the Baltic, while
America might supply the Tsar with privateers. Despite their different
traditions on maritime legal issues, Britain and France adopted a joint
from other suppliers; grain exports had already been prohibited by the Tsar.
Thus, the policy was based on Free Tradeconcepts.
France did not share the free trade agenda, fearing the political
quences ofa grain shortage. The French were astonished when the
British allowed trade with the enemy, subject only to the blockade.
However, despite reservations, the French accepted British blockade policy
throughout the war. It provoked little comment, and no debate in
Parliament. The Queens Advocate, J.D. Harding, a man ofdistinctly old-
fashioned views, regularly disagreed and raised objections to anything that
smacked ofnovelty.
Flaws in the Allied blockade policy became apparent when the antici-
pated tight blockade was delayed, or in the case ofthe Black Sea, not
imposed at all. Similarly, Russian ships were widely and all too often
fraudulently transferred to other registries, denying the Navy a reasonable
the Austrian ultimatum put pressure on Prussia, which had been acting as a
conduit for Russian trade. Finally, on 5 January 1856, the British explicitly
warned Prussia that they would use naval force ifnecessary to halt this trade.
Within days Prussia told Russia that it could no longer guarantee remaining
neutral. This was significant because Prussia had done more to help Russia
limit damage caused by the naval blockade than any other power.
The Crimean War was sparked by Russian demands on Turkey, but it
involved fighting from the Arctic to the Pacific. Initially, the main British
naval effort was in the Baltic Sea. Their goal was to counter the large
These minor operations were important, impressing on the Russians the
The Baltic Sea theatre ofoperations
owners entitled to damages. While Graham believed Harding was making
unnecessary trouble, Harding wrote to Napier calling for an effective
blockade. The Admiraltys demand for blockades revealed the underlying
political pressures.
In late May, Napier declared the Russian coast as far east as Sweaborg
and Eckholm to be blockaded. He urged that Harding be told that steam
treatment ofneutrals was reduced to printed statements, leaving officers
with no doubts how to act.
In 1855, Key, still commanding
was stationed offHelsingfors
[Helsinki] closing the coastal shipping route to hostile gunboats and any
merchant vessels. He took a prominent part in the attack on the fortress of
Sweaborg, but saw no commercial shipping.
By 1855, the only vessels
attempting to pass the blockade were boats, since the key trade with Russia
was through Prussia and Sweden.
British opinion was that the impact of
the blockade could only be improved by raising the level ofthe war from
limited to total. Had the war continued into 1856, the British intended to
apply a more rigorous delineation ofneutral and belligerent status to close
the Prussian loophole, while Sweden was about to join the allies.
The blockade ofthe GulfofBothnia was extended north as additional
cruisers became available and the southern coast was blockaded by 22
June.
The entire Gulfwas blockaded by mid-July to stop the export of
Russian produce to Sweden.
One officer reported that the blockade in the
GulfofBothnia had driven up the price oftar in Sweden by over 50
percent. Ships that did test the cordon were usually seized. The British
remained active in the Baltic until the weather worsened and the tempera-
ture fell. Soon the blockade could be left to the sea ice. By mid-November
the British cruisers had left the GulfofBothnia and the GulfofFinland.
The Admiralty commended the officers and men involved in the second
Baltic campaign for keeping up a most effective blockadeand for
harassing the enemys forces on shore. The blockade had been maintained
until the last moment when the cruisers were driven away by the early
severity ofthe weather and the ports on the Finnish coast appeared to be
In two seasons the British had conducted a highly
professional campaign, charted and mastered a complex navigation,
displayed remarkable restraint, translated command ofthe sea into a major
attack on the Russian economy, and distracted Russians forces from the land
campaigns.
The Black Sea theatre ofoperations
exploited the strategic necessity for cutting Russian supplies. Unable to
find the ships to extend this system around the Russian coast, the two
Admirals proposed to exploit the geography ofthe Euxine, by leaving the
blockade to be imposed by Turkish ships in the Bosphorus. This was
strikingly similar to the system adopted in World War I and World War
II. However, it proved to be too audacious for Harding, who insisted on a
formal declaration that specific locations had been placed under blockade
on a particular day.
In consequence, no blockade was imposed in 1854, even the strategic
Danube blockade being relaxed when the armies moved to the Crimea.
Dundas could only undertake to impose an effective blockade ofthe
whole Russian coastafter the Grand Raid on Sevastopol was over.
While Dundas grappled with the strategic and logistic demands ofthe
Crimean campaign, merchants in London pressed the Admiralty for
action, complaining that since no blockade had been imposed, Russian
goods were undercutting supplies they had secured from alternative
sources. By December the Admiralty, realizing that the French were not
going to help, ordered Dundas to blockade such ports as he could on his
own. Even that proved beyond his resources. Dundas and Hamelin were
reduced to issuing a general notice oftheir intention to impose a
blockade on 1 February 1855, by which time they would have handed over
their commands.
The Black Sea was not an important location for a blockade. Russian
exports had been stopped, and any useful imports were clearly contraband,
and could be seized at the Bosphorus. During the year the British captured
68 ships ofa total of2,343 tons, an average ofonly thirty-five tons apiece.
These were small coasters, seized for carrying contraband.
The Blockades impact on Russia and Britain
The question ofhow far the blockade harmed Russia remains contentious.
The Russian war effort was hampered throughout by the lack ofmodern
weapons and machinery. The lack ofcoal was a serious problem, while
industries that relied on bulky imports were crippled. However, the real
weakness ofRussia lay in her fiscal dependence on the regular, large exports
ofbulky primary produce such as timber, grain, and semi-finished iron to
generate funds; by the 1850s, grain accounted for 35 percent ofRussian
exports, almost twice the figure offifty years earlier.
The rapid decrease in wartime spending was linked to the collapse of
import-based customs revenues. The astonishing campaign ofdestruction
waged around the Sea ofAzov against state-purchased supplies in 1855 did
more damage than the blockade.
When imports were banned at the
outbreak ofwar the loss ofincome only exacerbated a serious deficit problem.
Russian state finances were already in deficit before the war, therefore interest
rates were rising and the exchange rate ofthe ruble was falling. With state
Andrew Lambert
The Crimean War blockade
Table 5.1
Russia: finance, revenue
and trade, 1853
Expenditure
(Million paper
rubles)
(Total)
(Customs)
(Excise)
(Direct Tax)
Overall
Trade
Grain Export
(Thousand
Trade with
Britain
Trade w
ith
Germany
65.3
39.5
123160
2264
4123
152170
3972
3822
Source: Brian R. Mitchell,
European Historical Statistics
. 2nd revised edn (London: Macmillan, 1980) 360, 511, 580, 610, 750, 735.
Austria, Sweden, and possibly Prussia, the blockade would become far more
effective, inflicting long-term damage on the Russian state that would leave
it weakened for decades.
The war led to an 800-million ruble deficit. Heavy cuts in defense
spending were essential to bolster the states credit rating after 1856.
banking system collapsed, and the exchange rate never recovered. As late as
adequate supplies ofmodern weapons, steam machinery, coal, and other
vital stores. State revenues had collapsed, and food riots and related civil
disorder were a growing distraction for the army. Because the allied
demands did not pose a fundamental threat to the existence ofthe Russian
state, the decision to accept peace was relatively easy.
By contrast the British escaped the worst effects ofeconomic warfare,
The Declaration ofParis
While the representatives ofthe powers were assembled at Paris, the issue of
war at sea came under review, specifically the two most controversial areas
ofblockade and privateering. Initially the delegates intended to sign a reso-
lution against privateering, but extended their discussions to cover
blockades.
Having played a major role in forming British maritime warfare
of1866 and 187071 were both short and limited. In such circumstances
blockades would prove to be irrelevant, since the conflicts would be over
before they could have any effect. However, the Orders in Councilwould
The Union Blockade ofthe Confederacy
The Union Navys blockade during the American Civil War (186165)
6The Union Navys Blockade
Reconsidered
David G. Surdam*
Mobile, Charleston, and Savannah ranked second through fifth, respectively.
New Orleans handled about 90 percent ofthe value ofNew Yorks domestic
exports, while the other three Southern ports easily outranked Boston (the
sixth-largest exporter). Richmond and Texas ports were also significant
export centers, rivaling Philadelphia in terms ofvalue.
New Orleans was the great Southern trade center, dwarfing all the
remaining Southern ports; indeed, the value ofits domestic exports was
more than those ofthe remaining Southern ports combined. The antebellum
South exported primarily staple products, with New Orleans exporting
almost halfofthe Souths raw cotton (see Table 6.1).
Direct Southern imports offoreign goods were relatively small. The
regions imports ($30 million) were only one-seventh the value ofits exports.
However, this ratio understates the Southern importation offoreign goods,
many ofwhich initially arrived in Northern ports. Still, an examination of
direct Southern imports is illuminating. In terms ofvalue offoreign
imports, New Orleans took in over five-sixths ofthe Southern portstotal
value; what wartime officials would later characterize as luxuries constituted
a significant share ofthe imports. Southerners imported large quantities of
manufactured iron and steel, the bulk ofit railroad iron (almost $2,000,000).
Table 6.1
Value of domestic exports from leading Southern ports (year ending 30 June
1860)
Total Value (
Raw Cotton Total Value (
New Orleans
107,812,580
96,166,118
Mobile
38,670,183
38,533,042
Charleston
21,179,350
19,633,295
Savannah
18,351,554
17,809,127
Texas
5,772,158
5,744,981
Richmond
5,098,720
41,483
Wilmington
650,092
Key West
580,165
401,919
Norfolk
479,885
14,783
Source: U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1860, pp.
317 and 350.
motive engines. The South produced less than 4 % ofthe pig iron (36,790 tons).
The region also lagged in producing machinery, steam engines, and guns.
Thus, the South needed to import boots and shoes, clothing, heavy manu-
factures, arms, munitions, and railroad supplies. A railroad official estimated
that almost 50,000 tons ofrails were needed annually just to
Southern railroads and that existing iron mills in the South were capable of
supplying less than halfofthis. Indeed, during the antebellum era Southern
railroads had imported the bulk oftheir railroad iron from Europe; in some
years, these imports amounted to 65,000 tons.
However, the South was not entirely bereft ofthe heavy industry needed to
supply its railroads and new navy. The Tredegar Iron Works, near Richmond,
Virginia, was a major iron producer. The company had experience in producing
naval ordnance, but the Confederate states were destined to be short ofiron for
armor plating and rails.
Table 6.2
Value of U.S. manufacturing production
Confederate
Total U.S.
Agricultural implements
1,018,913
17,597,
960
Scythes
552,753
Shovels, spades, forks, hoes
1,638,876
Boots, shoes
3,973,313
91,889,298
Cotton good
8,072,067
107,337,783
Firearms
72,652
2,362,681
Flour and meal
37,996,470
248,580,365
Bar, sheet, railroad iron
2,449,569
31,888,705
Bar (tons)
14,072
227,682
Rail (tons)
12,180
235,107
Boiler plate (tons)
0,895
Car wheels (railroad)
2,083,350
Locomotive engines
133,000
4,866,900
Engines (number)
470
Machinery, steam engines
5,750,650
46,757,486
Pig iron
953,903
20,870,120
(tons)
36,790
987,559
Mens cloth
2,573,045
80,830,555
Provisions
145,000
31,986,433
Salt
451,484
2,289,504
Ship and boatbuilding
772,870
11,667,661
Wagons
1,381,887
8,703,937
Woollen goods
1,995,324
61,895,217
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Cens
us,
hth Census of the United States
Manufacturing
, 1865,
clxxvii
clxxxvi, 715
18, and 733
42 (data from 1860).
late May 1861 that the mills south ofKentucky were unable to roll iron ofthe
desired thickness.
In addition, the seceding states could not manufacture the
large engines and boilers necessary for ironclad warships. The Confederacys
inability to roll iron plating ofsufficient thickness or to produce propulsion
machinery would not have been severe drawbacks had the Confederate navy
enjoyed easy access to British production, which the Union blockade precluded.
The antebellum South also required considerable intra- and interregional
movement offoodstuffs. Large quantities ofNorthern packed meat were
shipped down the Mississippi River to New Orleans for consumption there or
for reshipment to river towns and Gulfports. In addition, New Orleans
received over 50,000 head ofcattle per annum from Westernand Texas
sources; antebellum trans-Gulfshipments ofTexas cattle represented a poten-
tial solution to the Souths meat supply problem.
In addition, in the absence
ofan effective blockade, foreign and even Northern producers could have alle-
viated any potential shortages ofmeat.
As for grain, most ofthe grain shipped along the Atlantic seaboard went
by sailing vessels. In addition, much ofthe wheat received internally at
Richmond arrived via river and canal; railroads typically were not the main
carriers offoodstuffs. A similar situation occurred in the Mississippi valley.
Although the informal Confederate-imposed embargo on raw cotton
exports initially reduced export revenues, the Union blockade was the main
problem. Southern planters produced some 6 million bales ofcotton during
the war. Large amounts ofraw cotton were stored in Alabama until near the
wars end. Shipping the cotton to blockade-running ports and then through
the blockade was so difficult that neither the Confederate government nor
Table 6.3
Volume and value of receipts received at New Orleans from the interior
Year
Cotton
Sugar
Molasses
Tobacco
Value (
1856
57
1,573,247
43,463
84,169
58,928
158,061,000
1857
58
1,678,616
202,783
339,343
90,147
167,156,000
1858
59
1,774,298
257,225
353,715
85,133
172,953,000
1859
60
2,255,448
195,185
313,840
95,499
185,211,000
1860
61
1,849,312
174,637
313,260
43,756
155,864,000
1861
62
38,880
225,356
401,404
7,429
51,511,000
862
63
22,078
85,531
202,616
4,774
29,766,000
1863
64
131,044
75,173
143,460
15,547
79,234,000
1864
65
271,015
9,345
18,725
16,346
111,013,000
Source:
New Orleans Price Current
, Annual Reports.
Notes
Year: 1 Septem
ber through 31 August
Cotton: in bales
Sugar: in hogsheads
Molasses: in barrels
Tobacco: in hogsheads and bales
Value: value of all receipts received from interior
New Orleans surrendered to Farraguts forces in May 1862; the capture of V
ksburg opened the
entire Mississippi River to Union commerce in July 1863.
Cotton growers in Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and western Alabama
faced unattractive alternatives: they could try to ship cotton by wagon and rail
to eastern ports, by river and wagon to Texas ports or even to the Rio Grande,
ChiefofOrdnance Brigadier-General Josiah Gorgas, equally frustrated, lam-
ented that a large proportion of[his purchasing agents] purchases have
fallen into the hands ofthe enemy.
Despite these disadvantages, imports were the main source ofsmall arms
for the Confederacy, as the Southerners were able to manufacture only
modest numbers ofthese weapons. It is estimated that the South imported
the majority ofits total arsenal ofshoulder-fired arms. The Confederacy
David G. Surdam
also needed to import nitre, as it had been unable to stockpile enough from
British India before the Union blockade tightened. Although some nitre
seeped through the blockade, the Confederacy was forced to establish a
Nitre Bureau in early 1862; the bureau succeeded in providing the South
with minimal levels ofthe chemical, but the cost was very high, perhaps five
The Southern railroads were hard pressed just to maintain themselves,
since domestic resources were woefully insufficient for improving the existing
lines. However, in the absence ofan effective blockade, Southern railroads
might have easily purchased and shipped the requisite material from Europe
and perhaps even from the North. Southern railroads attempted to import
railroad iron and supplies through the blockade, but with limited success.
With the growing stringency ofthe Union blockade, blockade runners natu-
rally preferred to bring in small-volume, high-value commodities, not bulky
iron rails and railroad equipment. The railroads decided in January 1862 to
press the Confederate government for help in importing supplies, but it
refused. Eventually the Confederate War Department assisted some Virginia
railroads in obtaining supplies from England, but such instances were rare.
Some companies used cotton exports as a basis for purchasing supplies to be
the dwindling carrying capacity ofSouthern railroads coincided with growing
burdens on rail shipment due to wartime and blockade-induced changes in
shipping patterns. The loss ofGulfand Atlantic coastal shipping and the
interruption ofinland traffic on the Mississippi River and Chesapeake Bay
merely compounded the demand for rail service.
The Union Navys control ofthe American waters had three main economic
effects: denying the Confederacy the badly needed purchasing power that
exporting its staple products would have generated; raising the costs and
reducing the volume ofimported goods; and dislocating intraregional trade.
While it would be too much to claim that the Union naval superiority alone
tilted the scale against the Confederacy, these factors suggest that without its
superior naval power the North would have faced much greater and perhaps
insuperable difficulties in subduing the South.
A final strategic effect ofthe Union blockade on the Confederate war
effort was that, in the process ofenforcing it, the Union navy helped stunt
the embryonic Confederate navy. By blockading the mouth ofthe
Mississippi River, the Union forced the New Orleans shipbuilders to bring
iron and machinery they needed from Virginia and the eastern Confederacy
The Union Navys blockade reconsidered
The Sino-Japanese war, 18945
The Japanese blockade ofWeihaiwei and the destruction ofthe Beiyang
7The First Sino-Japanese War
Japanese Destruction ofthe
Chinese army, China had in this war a chance, and only one chance to win,
Second Division and most ofthe Sixth Division, both under the command
ofMarshal Iwao
yama, would be redeployed across the Yellow Sea to
Shandong Province in preparation for the attack on Weihaiwei.
Japanese were deciphering Chinas telegram traffic, they were well aware
that little attempt had been made to defend the Shandong coastline, but only
the city ofWeihaiwei.
with two boats opening fire as a diversion so that others could disable the flag-
ship. The next night, a squadron ofJapanese torpedo-boats repeated the
attack, disabling two other warships and a transport.
On 7 February, the
Japanese army and navy launched a joint attack on Weihaiwei. In response,
the seaworthy Chinese torpedo-boats mutinied and unsuccessfully tried to run
the blockade.
After continuing bombardments on the remaining fortifica-
tions on the harbor islands, the Chinese surrendered on 12 February.
The fall ofPyongyang occurred at approximately the same time as the
autumnal equinox, while Japans attack on Weihaiwei corresponded with
celebrations for the Chinese New Year. Li Hongzhang, the creator ofthe
Admiral Ding had no choice but to commit suicide. The Guangxu
Emperor had already downgraded him over the summer for not preventing
the Japanese navy from entering the Bo Hai. After the fall ofPort Arthur,
the emperor had downgraded him again and attempted to hand him over to
the Board ofPunishment. This could have meant decapitation had not Li
With the advantage oftwenty-twenty hindsight, it seems obvious over a
century after the war that, with the fall ofPort Arthur, China was already
protracted war lest the Han coalesce around overthrowing the dynasty
ofits warships had been destroyed and twelve had surrendered to become
additions to the Japanese navy. By contrast, Japan had lost two vessels,
for puncturing the overly positive international image ofChina.
United States, some went so far as to call the Japanese the Yankees ofthe
The Japan Weekly Mail
summed up the strategic situation
Japanese drive to Beijing would result in their overthrow by the Japanese if
not sooner by some enterprising Han Chinese. The Manchus correctly
concluded that their only hope for survival rested with diplomacy.
The Chinese debacle at Weihaiwei demonstrated that the best equipment
in the world is useless in the wrong hands. It also demonstrated the foolhar-
The SpanishAmerican War, 1898
On 22 April 1898, Rear-Admiral William Sampson, acting on orders
8The Naval Blockade ofCuba
War
Mark L. Hayes*
Figure 8.1
Timeline for the SpanishAmerican War
the Navy Department had a solid body ofplans prepared over four years
by its leading officers. Although the realities ofwar would force several
modifications, many ofthe concepts discussed in these plans were imple-
mented: a strong blockade ofCuba; support for the insurgents; operations
against Spanish forces in the Philippines and Puerto Rico; and the forma-
tion ofa squadron to operate in Spanish waters. Most importantly, nearly
every plan called for merchant vessels to serve as auxiliary cruisers,
colliers, and transports.
By contrast, the Spanish were ill prepared to defend their overseas posses-
ships (usually colliers). Key West served as the base for U.S. naval operations
in the Caribbean. International law permitted, but did not require, neutrals
to provide belligerent ships just enough coal to allow them to reach the
nearest friendly port. Colliers were the most common source offuel for
vessels blockading Cuba. Six were available at the start ofthe war, and an
additional eleven were purchased by August.
Ship endurance depended on factors such as bunker capacity, coal
storage on deck, coal quality, the number ofboilers, and the ships speed
while under way. Most major U.S. warships had an operational range of
around 4,000 nautical miles, or just over two weeks ofcontinuous steaming
at ten knots.
Naturally, commanding officers were reluctant to allow their
asked Congress on 11 April for permission to intervene in Cuba. On 21
April, he ordered the Navy to begin the blockade, and Spain followed with a
declaration ofwar on 23 April. Congress responded with a formal declara-
Nevertheless, he departed the Cape Verde Islands under orders on 29 April
with his squadron offour armored cruisers, and towing three torpedo-boat
destroyers, intending to steam for Puerto Rico. To look for the Spanish
squadron, the U.S. Navy Department had three fast former mail steamers
Cervera had put into Santiago, he would have to bring his squadron west to
deliver the munitions thought to be an essential part ofhis mission. As addi-
tional information arrived at the Navy Department confirming Cerveras
presence at Santiago, Long and Sampson dispatched several messages
encouraging Schley to proceed to that port and prevent the Spanish
squadron from escaping.
On 24 May, Schley learned through Cuban insur-
gents that Cerveras ships were not in port, and that evening the American
squadron headed east.
Schleys message informing Sampson ofhis departure also conveyed
concerns about potentially insufficient coal supplies. The one collier then
with the squadron was insufficient to coal enough ships even when the
weather afforded an opportunity. Schley informed Sampson that these
concerns and his desire to coal his ships at a protected anchorage led him to
choose Mle St Nicolas, Haiti, as his next destination.
The Flying Squadron arrived offSantiago on 26 May, and Schley
communicated with the American cruisers watching the port. Engine prob-
lems on the collier caused the squadron to average only seven knots in its
journey from Cienfuegos. The weather was also too rough to allow coaling
at sea, so several ofhis smaller vessels were running low. Rather than
remaining on station with his larger ships and trusting Sampson to supply
him, Schley ordered his squadron to head west for Key West to refuel.
Sampson, who had since returned to Key West, and Long were shocked
when they learned ofSchleys intentions. Making it clear that the Flying
Squadron was expected to remain on station, Sampson assembled his
squadron and departed for Santiago. On 27 May, the weather offthe south
coast ofCuba improved, and Schley reversed course once again, finally
establishing a blockade at Santiago de Cuba on 29 May.
Schleys coaling problems impressed on Sampson and the Navy
Department the need to seize a sheltered anchorage on the south coast of
Cuba. Guantnamo Bay had already been considered. Shortly after Schley
established the blockade ofSantiago, Sampson ordered the First Marine
Battalion at Key West to embark on its transports and prepare to land in
Cuba. He also sent McCalla to reconnoiter Guantnamo Bays anchorage.
McCallas report was favorable. On 10 June, the Marine battalion under
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Huntington landed, establishing a position on
JointLandSea Operations
McKinley and his advisers had intended to wait until the end ofthe rainy
season to send a major land expedition to Cuba. However, they believed that
the bottling-up ofthe Spanish squadron at Santiago afforded an opportu-
nity to strike a blow against Spains military capability in the Caribbean. On
ofthe armored cruiser USS
Brooklyn
, guarding the entrance to Santiago
de Cuba along with the battleships
Texas
Oregon
Iowa
the armed yachts
Vixen
. Anderson had been studying the
smoke rising above the hill that blocked the view to the Spanish ships in
the harbor. Just before 0930 he spotted the column ofsmoke moving
toward the entrance, and reported the change to the ships navigator
Lieutenant Hodgson. After confirming the quartermasters statement,
Hodgson grabbed a megaphone, and called for signal 250(meaning
Enemy coming out action) to be hoisted. Three minutes later, the
American cruiser was underway with guns ready to shoot, ammunition on
hand, fire hoses laid out, and watertight hatches shut.
Brooklyn
toward the enemy, opening the fight by firing its eight-inch guns, and the
other U.S. warships quickly followed.
Most ofthe battle was a running fight as the blockading vessels
losses induced the Spanish government to sign a peace protocol with the
United States on 12 August 1898. The naval blockade ofCuba, the central
component ofU.S. war plans from the mid-1890s, was a clear strategic success.
Even so, there were a number ofoperational lessons to be learned from
the difficulties encountered offCuba. Although the U.S. Navy isolated the
larger ports from overseas trade, the interdiction ofcoastal traffic proved
much more difficult. Commander W.H. Brownson believed that the Spanish
It was no surprise that the British and their French ally would seek to cut off
Germany from trade with the rest ofthe world once hostilities began in
August 1914. The British had the worlds largest navy but initially only a
small professional army that at first could play but a limited role on the
Continent. However, what is surprising is how little impact this blockade
appears to have initially had on Germany and her allies during the first
couple ofyears ofthe war. Ifone ofthe many German offensives had
succeeded, and the tide ofbattle shifted in their favor, then the naval
blockade might not be studied today.
9World War I: The Blockade
Paul Halpern
In the north, given the extensive line to be covered, the number of
cruisers available was none-too-large, especially since all ships could not be
expected to be at sea all the time. The brunt ofthe work fell on Rear-
Admiral Dudley De Chair and his Tenth Cruiser Squadron, later to be
The Naval Blockade in Action
The Admiralty, in response to German minelaying, allegedly under a neutral
flag, declared that as of5 November 1914 the North Sea would be a military
area with shipping subject to Admiralty control. Initially shipping was to be
examined in the Straits ofDover, a natural choke point. The stop at the
Downs the sheltered roadstead offthe Kentish coast where examinations
took place might have been satisfactory for the Dutch, but it was not so
for the Scandinavians who generally found it expedient to proceed around
the north ofScotland. As a concession, the British allowed them to submit
to examination at Kirkwall in the Orkneys. Subsequently examinations were
from operating far inside the Adriatic, Austria-Hungary was effectively cut
offfrom the Mediterranean. At the western entrance to the Mediterranean,
the British flotillas at Gibraltar effectively controlled traffic. In August
1915, the British admiral at Gibraltar reported that every ship passing
through the straits had been examined.
Finally, British control ofEgypt
and the entrance to the Suez Canal meant that traffic through the
Mediterranean was at the mercy ofthe Allies.
Italy remained neutral until May 1915 and might have been a potential gap
distinct effect in Constantinople, although the situation was eased for the
Turks by the opening ofdirect links with Germany at the beginning of1916.
The Mechanics ofImplementing the Blockade
The latter committee was eventually superseded after the formation ofthe
Ministry ofBlockade by the War Trade Advisory Committee under Lord
Crewe. As part ofthe newly formed ministry, it was charged with coordinating
blockade policy in London.
An agreement was concluded in May 1918
allowing a certain amount ofSwedish exports to Germany, and a designated
amount ofcommodities through the Allied blockade to Sweden, as well as
providing for the chartering ofSwedish tonnage to the Allies.
As the war continued, the lists ofcontraband grew and items considered
conditional contraband were moved to the list ofabsolute contraband. The
fact that the imports ofthe neutrals bordering Germany rose sharply above
Germany and Belgium, but its grain from beyond Europe. The Dutch also
had to maintain links with overseas territories, notably the Dutch East
Indies. In December 1914, the Dutch sought to appease the British by
Bunker control was another effective instrument ofcoercion, given the
importance ofGreat Britain as a source ofcoal for transatlantic shipping.
The system went into effect in October 1915 and stipulated that no coal
would be given to any ship that traded with a German port or carried goods
destined for the enemy or ofenemy origin. Moreover, coal would not be
provided to ships chartered by an enemy subject or a firm on the black-list.
Ships receiving British coal had voluntarily to call at British ports, where
their cargoes could be approved.
German Reaction to the Blockade
The German navy never really found a satisfactory solution to the problem
ofthe distant blockade, even though it was apparent even before the war
that the British would pursue this strategy. They had expected to wear down
British forces engaged in a close blockade through mines and submarines,
He also complained that, ofships sent in to Kirkwall and Lerwick in recent
weeks, only 13 percent were sent south for further examination and probably
many ofthe latter were eventually allowed to proceed unhindered. Jellicoe
Given these limitations, the blockade took a long time to be fully effective.
Until 1916, German industry does not seem to have been seriously affected. It
was evident that, during the period ofthe so-called restricted blockade, that is,
up to the Orders-in-Council ofMarch 1915, there remained a considerable
transit trade through the neutrals to Germany. Nevertheless, the German
government was still obligated in January 1915 to issue food cards for bread and
flour, the prelude to a general system ofrationing in 1916. At the same time, the
government ordered potato flour to be added to wheat to produce the infamous
k-brot
, another indicator ofa growing decline in the quality as well as quantity
ofGerman food. Ifone could generalize about a complicated subject, it would
be to say that German demand was rapidly exceeding production.
Certainly German armies in 1916 brought some respite by the conquest
and overrunning ofmost ofRumania, thereby permitting the Germans and
Austrians to exploit its grain and oil, and opening the Danube to traffic that
could not be touched by Allied sea power. The Germans even used military
engineers to improve the flow oftraffic through the rapids ofthe Iron Gates.
The tonnage that moved upstream and downstream in 19161917 was more
than twice that ofthe highest year before the war.
But this was a poor
substitute for full access to the worlds produce. The winter of19161917,
with its poor potato harvest, was long remembered as the turnip winter.
By the end ofWorld War I there is no question that the German and
Austrian populations were suffering as a result ofthe blockade. After the
collapse ofRussia, even the economic booty extracted from the Ukraine
proved to be only a fraction ofwhat had been anticipated.
Therefore,
German propagandists found it easy to blame civilian suffering on the so-
called hunger blockade,but it is difficult to pin this down, and there is a
lively historical debate about the effectiveness ofthe blockade.
The Chinese theatre ofoperations
Japans blockade ofChina during 19371945 resulted from unimaginative
thinking by the Japanese military. Although the Imperial Japanese Army
10Japanese Naval Blockade of
Sino-Japanese War, 193741
Ken-ichi Arakawa*
discussed in advance, because the Chinese Navy was considered to be so
weak.
The Japanese Navy begin to formulate plans for a naval blockade
only after hostilities had begun.
On 12 July 1937, with rapid escalation following the Marco Polo Bridge
incident leading to full-scale war, for the first time the Imperial Navy
Headquarters disclosed its campaign plan against China: Focus on self-
defense activities without declaring war. In the event that China declares
war, Japan shall declare war. The principal objective is to chasten the
Chinese 29th Army and the battlefield should be limited to Beijing and
Tianjin. Along with the development ofthe war situation, regional, air,
and [naval] blockade operations should be considered in order to protect
residents in the area and to chasten the Chinese Army in the shortest
period oftime.
This plan comprised two tactical stages. In the first, the battlefield was
limited to Beijing and Tianjin, while the second the chasten Chinastage
entailed full-scale operations including a blockade. According to the navy
operational plan:
The blockade should be implemented in the style ofa
pacific blockade ofthe area where Japanese troops are stationed, such as the
lower reaches ofthe Yangzi River and along the Zhejiang coast.
Objectives
shall be Chinese ships. Problems with third parties shall not be incurred
during the implementation. But, depending on the situation, operations
shall be escalated regionally and [expanded] in scale.
announced that the Imperial Navy will take all necessary and effective
measuresto chasten China, thus abandoning its non-expansion policy.
effect it had declared all-out war, a war that would not end until almost
exactly eight years later.
The navy had complicated objectives. Although it rapidly accomplished
the primary stated objective ofprotecting local Japanese residents, many
officers wanted to attack further. The secondary objective ofchastening
Chinawould be accomplished with a pacific blockade ofChinas coast-
line. During August 1937, the Naval High Command ordered the Third
China, they had to establish control over the Yangzi River, which meant
taking control ofHankou, a commercial and naval port hundreds ofmiles
up the river.
The Hankou Campaign began in March 1938 with naval units
sweeping away mines, blocking-ships, and obstacles along the Yangzi River.
By December 1937, the navy had opened the water route to Nanjing, which
also opened the river approaches to Hankou, which fell to a joint armynavy
attack on 26 October 1938.
This put the Japanese Navy in control ofthe Yangzi River area from
Shanghai to Hankou, permitting the extension ofthe pacific blockade up
capturing Canton meant undermining British influence. Air raids by naval
paratroopers on the railways connecting the city with Hong Kong and
Negotiations remained deadlocked. On 30 December, the navy began air
raids on the Yunnan railway bridges. On 1 February 1940, however, the
bombing ofa train claimed over 100 victims, including French women and
children.
Diplomatic talks with France resumed but made no progress, and
air raids were resumed in late April.
Attempts to cut the Yunnan railway backfired, since it was run by the
French and the raids infringed French interests. Instead ofleading to victory,
these air raids actually made the blockade even more difficult to enforce.
Japans South China campaigns revealed the extraordinary difficulty of
blockading a land power like China. As land routes were severed, new routes
took their place. U.S. attempts to interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail twenty years
shipments through the Burma Road for three months.
The Japanese
advance into French Indochina and the Tripartite Pact made this agree-
ment null and void. Britain notified Japan that it would reopen the Burma
Road on 8 October 1940. Japan responded with bombing raids beginning
on 25 October, but bridges were soon reconstructed while raids over
narrow mountain valleys could not be conducted with pinpoint accuracy.
To close the Burma Road required ground troops, but this could lead to
war against Britain. The Japanese Navy and diplomatic staffsearched for
alternatives.
In response to Japans more aggressive policies, the U.S. started to imple-
ment an embargo or an economic blockade. Previously Washington had
taken relatively mild measures, such as abolishing the U.S. and Japan Trade
and Commerce Agreement. On 25 September 1940, it announced that it
would grant US$25 million credit to the Chongqing government. The next
these sharp decreases in ships, Japanese shipping in China expanded from
only 17 percent ofthe total tonnage to account for 45 percent in 1940,
surpassing even Great Britain.
China maintained 312 ships, totaling about 456,000 gross tons before the
implementation ofthe blockade. Almost all ofthem, except for ships on the
inland rivers and on lakes, were rendered useless by the blockade. Chinese
tonnage declined by a total of270,000 gross tons, including 31,000 gross
tons from ships captured or impounded and 14,000 gross tons for ships
reflagged to other countries. In just three years Chinas percentage ofthe
trade dropped from 27 percent to only 5 percent.
Great Britain had dominated the merchant service for coastal China
since 1900. Britain initially took advantage ofthe Japanese blockade to
raise freight charges. With the expansion ofthe blockade, and especially
after the Hankou Campaign, which blocked British ships from the Yangzi
River and cut this main transportation artery, the positions ofGreat
Britain and Japan were reversed. British influence in the area, especially
around Hong Kong, was threatened by the expansion ofthe Sino-Japanese
War, resulting from Japans capture ofChinese ports and its advance into
French Indochina.
Consequently, Britain developed new routes through the unoccupied
areas from the ZhejiangGuangzhou district to Chongqing. As a result,
Table 10.1
Changes in the percentage and gross tonnage of shipping to and from China
Year
Japan
China
Others
Total
1936
24,913
57,345
39,355
23,426
145,019
1937
12,815
36,105
21,593
19,524
90,037
1938
8,743
28,563
5,623
16,208
59,137
1939
15,755
19,233
2,696
14,242
51,926
1940
18,738
10,843
2,224
9,581
41,391
Source: The Northern China Merc
nt Service Association, Northern China Merchant
Service Pandect
(1942), 42.
Notes
Units: upper = percentage
lower = thousands of metric tons.
the same rights as before to conduct marine transport in the Far East. It did
so, even though it was forced to narrow its activities around China and lost a
large number ofmerchant ships in Europe.
Other neutral shipping was affected more by the European situation than
by the Japanese blockade. In particular, Germany and Italy tried to advance
into the Far Eastern transportation business after December 1937. After the
Table 10.2
Chinas trade figures after th
e Marco Polo Bridge incident
Year
Exports
Imports
Total
1936
42,271 (100)
56,404 (100)
98,675 (100)
1937
49,990 (118)
56,787 (101)
106,777 (108)
1938
32,770 (78)
53,568 (95)
86,338 (87)
1939
25,949 (61)
81,390 (144)
107,338 (109)
1940
32,302 (76)
89,756 (159)
122,058 (124)
Source
Toa Institute, Economic Development of Occupied Areas in China (1944), 367.
Notes
Units: thousands of pounds (percentage change, 1936=10)
Kai-shek.
Unwittingly, the Japanese naval blockade, which was supposed
to prevent goods from being transported to the enemy, established economic
conditions that produced exactly the reverse. Ironically, legitimate trade
conveyed large amounts ofmilitarily useful goods to the enemy and so
contributed to the enemys war effort.
Withhindsight, Japan might have tightened the blockade more cheaply
and quickly by declaring war on China. From the beginning ofhostilities,
the declaration ofwar remained under discussion. China could not
declare war for fear oflosing U.S. supplies the Neutrality Acts prohib-
ited U.S. exports to belligerent countries. Likewise, Japan depended on
U.S. oil, gasoline, airplane parts, precision machinery, and tools. The
establishment ofthe Wang Jingwei government in 1940, which Japan
recognized as legitimate, changed the war from a regional conflict into a
civil war. Japan could still not declare war against China, however, since it
had already officially recognized Wangs government. Relations with
Britain and France were crucial, because success ofthe blockade
depended on cutting supply routes from their colonies, Hong Kong and
Indochina. A great impediment to cooperation was Japans alliance with
Germany and Italy. In this regard, the European war had a direct bearing
on Asian events.
In June 1941, to make matters worse, Japan impulsively decided to
advance into southern French Indochina. This policy was adopted without
serious discussion, but was then rapidly executed in July 1941. Japanese
actions immediately triggered British resistance and the U.S. total oil
embargo. In response, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters decided that war
against the U.S. was necessary, falsely assuming that not to attack would
entail Japans ruin. As this chapter shows, however, the naval blockade,
which began as a mere supporting operation for ground troops in Chinas
coastal areas, was actually quite effective. There was no real need to continue
Japans expansion further south. Certainly there was no need to go to war
Unlike Japans pacific blockade ofChina, which was not imposed under
wartime conditions, the U.S. blockade strategy against Japan was a total
blockade. Japanese trade and communications from overseas, including even
land routes inside China, were blockaded by U.S. forces. Starvation soon
loomed large in Japans future. The Pacific War that ravaged much ofEast
Asia and the Pacific had begun with a Japanese pacific blockade ofChina.
As was the case in World War I, a major portion ofthe British naval
11Naval Blockade and Economic
Warfare in the European War,
Geoffrey Till*
so forth. To some extent, they were prey to wishful thinking that
blockade,
sanctions or economic warfare
could be employed as a substitute for mili-
tary force.
Paradoxically, the British regarded the preparations that they knew the
Germans were taking to guard against the threat ofblockade as evidence
that such expectations were on the right track. The extent ofthese precau-
tions, however, did reinforce the conclusion that the economic blockade of
Germany would not be a quick and easy process. In the end, though, it was
expected to make a significant contribution to victory.
The North Atlantic theatre ofoperations
The Gradual Abandonment ofRestraint
Despite high expectations, the British were circumspect in their introduction
ofnaval blockade as a part ofeconomic warfare. In effect, this action was
initially limited to the modest and limited contraband controlsystem
introduced in 1914, under which neutral ships were searched for contraband;
iffound, the latter was impounded. They did not initiate early pre-emptive
purchasing ofneutral supplies, strategic bombing, or any other form of
attack on the adversarys war economy.
This was partly in deference to neutrals, since even the constrained system
ofcontraband controlattracted a hostile response from them. In October
1939, the Russians declared that British control measures
violate the
elementary principles offree navigation by merchant shipping; moreover,
regarding foodstuffs such as bread, meat, and butter as contraband indi-
rectly hurt women, children, and the old, and so broke the accepted laws of
war. The British response to such criticisms became increasingly robust.
First, there was nothing new about any ofthis. The British
were
conforming
was taken by the Royal Navy to Kirkwall, which was inside one, for exami-
nation. The United States protested, and so Churchill ordered that no more
American ships be stopped under such circumstances. But American objec-
tions to British attempts to control trade remained a problem, especially in
the Caribbean.
To an extent, these American reactions and the original assertions of
British rights were a reflection both ofthe moral and legal ambiguities of
the naval blockade, and ofsensitivity to the way in which they might be
viewed in neutral countries. For their part, the Germans made the most ofit,
both for domestic opinion and in the propaganda battle for foreign support.
Incidents such as the interception ofthe
Altmark
in Norwegian waters
were used by Germany to demonstrate Britains willingness to trample on
Britains willingness to engage in the progressive escalation was reinforced
by perceptions ofGerman behaviour. The British Order-in-Council of27
November 1939, which required every merchant vessel to discharge enemy
goods intended for export in a British or allied port, was represented as fair
and legal retaliation for the German sinking ofmerchant ships in violation
ofthe Submarine Protocol of1936, and indiscriminate mining in violation
ofthe Hague Convention, No. VIII of1907.
Any infringement ofneutral
rights this implied was held to be ofsmall consequence when compared to the
manner in which the enemy had already violated them by its attitude to
efforts were supplemented by smaller Armed Boarding Vessels (ABVs) and
Ocean Boarding Vessels (OBVs), intended for merchant-ship interceptions
in narrow waters and on the open ocean respectively. The Northern Patrol
was also reinforced by Coastal Command aircraft, and could call on the
Cargo Navicertor a Ship Navicertfrom British officials abroad; this
documentation advised examination officers that the cargo or even the
whole ship had already been cleared. This saved everyone much time. In
July 1940, the British made Navicerts compulsory, but by this time the only
surviving European neutrals all had easy access to the Reichs land borders,
so the work ofthe Contraband Control Service in Home Waters effectively
During the same period, twenty-seven German ships caught outside home
to 5 April 1940, while Germany lost 58 merchant ships totaling some 300,000
tons, a further 82 amounting to 480,000 tons got through.
The French participated in the naval blockade as well, operating their
own examination centers, with the
Ministre de Blocus
working closely with
Londons Contraband Committee and the Ministry ofEconomic Warfare.
Indeed, one oftheir submarines achieved a notable first in September 1939
by taking as prize the 5,522-ton
captured by such means.
had an interesting cargo ofcotton, lead
and travel up and down the Leads looking for German ore ships or any
other German merchant vessels, and then ram them by accident.
Through the exceptionally hard winter of193940, the German iron ore
trade proceeded through Norway with impunity, and this was one ofthe
factors that led to the eventual British change ofheart and a chain ofevents
that ended with the ill-fated Norway Campaign of1940. Germanys subse-
quent control ofNorway and Denmark considerably reduced the
effectiveness ofthe British blockade. To the extent that such expectations
encouraged the Germans to invade, it might even be said that British
economic pressure proved to be counter-productive.
The Blockade through June 1941
It is hard to come to a conclusion about the cost-effectiveness ofthe British
naval blockade up to the summer of1941. German war material totaling
558,857 tons had been seized from neutrals. These were substantial achieve-
ments but, compared to the overall costs ofthe war, this seems a useful rather
than a decisive contribution to the outcome. But to the ships and cargoes actu-
ally captured must be added the benefit the Germans might otherwise have
derived from uninhibited sea-based trade. According to one estimate, the
Navicert system had perhaps denied the Germans a further 3,600,000 tons of
material, although these results are notoriously difficult to quantify.
deals of11 February 1940 and 10 January 1941. In October 1939, for
instance, the German naval staffreported that Russian economic assistance
was crucial to counter a British economic blockade. The amounts antici-
pated were substantial, including 872,000 tons ofmineral oil products per
year, 500,000 tons ofiron ore, 934,500 tons offodder and legumes, 91,500
and fodder from Poland, antimony from Czechoslovakia, and so on. By
1942, the overall contribution ofthe conquered territories to the German
war economy was to more than double the 1940 rate.
Moreover, neutral
states became more cooperative, especially those that now found themselves
to be neighbors ofthe Reich. Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia,
Spain, and Portugal provided foodstuffs, copper, nickel, chrome, wolframite,
and bauxite.
According to many historians, in fact, the economic position ofthe Reich
during this period was sufficiently comfortable for Hitler not to have to
impose the rigors oftotal war on his own people. This position has more
recently come under attack from those who believe that Germany mobilized
and that civilian consumption was cut back more in the period from 1939 to
1941 than has often been realized.
Even so, the overall result seemed to
demonstrate the validity ofthe view that the Mackinderite heartland had
the resources with which to withstand the economic pressure brought by the
maritime powers.
With the German invasion ofRussia in June 1941, an important part of
this highly beneficial arrangement came to an abrupt end. From now on,
connections with Japan and the Far East could only be maritime. Worse
still, the demands ofan additional and major war in the East put huge new
strains on the German war economy. For the Germans, this was uncharted
territory. Coincidentally, the British wound up the Northern and Western
patrols in the same month, and their work came to be subsumed in the
ports in occupied France; the round trip to Japan and the Far East would
often take nine months or so. These voyages not infrequently also involved
support for German surface raiders and submarines operating in distant
waters, through the transport ofsupplies, torpedoes, and so on, and the
ability to collect prisoners taken from prizes.
The passage and cargo ofthe celebrated 2,729-ton blockade-runner
Alsterufer
, sunk on 27 December 1943, was fairly typical, although she flew
the Blue Ensign ofthe
Reichsdienst
equipment for the German U-boat base at Penang. She carried a large
amount ofcrude rubber, 200 tons oftin ingots, and 300 tons oftungsten
concentrates. Her crew comprised ten Merchant Navy officers, twenty-eight
Merchant Navy seamen, and thirty-eight naval ratings under a ChiefPetty
Officer. She left France in February 1943, took on cargo at Bangkok and at
Singapore, and went on to Japan before returning to Europe. She was sunk
in the Bay ofBiscay on 27 December 1943.
The effective operation ofGermanys war economy was, comparatively,
Part III
World War II
The Nationalists blockade ofthe PRC as ofJuly 1949
12The Nationalists Blockade of
the PRC, 194958
Yuan clarified this was not a blockade
; rather, it was an official closure
Law, and, on the information at present available to them, [the govern-
ment] are not prepared to respect it.War had never been officially
declared, and so the British government had received no indication
from the Chinese Nationalist Government that they recognize, or are
about to recognize, the Chinese Communists as having belligerent
status.Furthermore, because the Nationalist Navy was not actively
enforcing the blockade, a mere decree ofa lawful Government
purporting to close ports occupied by insurgents, without the mainte-
nance ofa real and effective blockade, cannot be regarded as valid
and such a decree cannot be recognized as resulting in a blockade in the
sense ofInternational Law.
According to one British analysis ofthe Nationalist blockade, submitted
on 4 July 1949, the 1947 blockade had been simply a closure order allowing
landing operations to expel the Dutch colonizers and recover Taiwan.
The Nationalists initially kept one regiment ofmarines on the Miao
Islands north of
Shandong Peninsula to blockade Bo Hai and the northern
ports, while they fortified Zhoushan and the Saddle Islands to blockade
the Y
angzi River. Meanwhile, the Lema and Wan Shan Islands near
Guangzhou, the P
Any possibility ofa PRC attack was effectively countered at the begin-
ning ofthe Korean War. On 27 June 1950, President Truman ordered the
the coastal islands.
From the very beginning ofthe blockade, it was decided that the crew of
each [blockading] vessel shares in the prize money from captured blockade
running ships.
Not surprisingly, many ofthe guerrillas were more intent
Indications are that most ofthe piracies are done by Nationalist guerillas
not under the effective control ofTaipei. The border line is obscure. In 1948
it was respectable for bandits to masquerade as Communist Liberation
forces; in 1952 it is respectable for pirates to masquerade as the Nationalist
Navy.
A good example ofhow the Nationalistguerrilla blockade functioned
was the case ofthe
Admiral Hardy
, which was intercepted by guerrillas on 8
September 1952 while trying to enter Fuzhou. The ship was taken to White
Dog Island,where the guerrillas claimed that it was carrying strategic
items, and so impounded its entire cargo. A $2,300 bribe was necessary to
win the release ofthe ship and its crew. Before allowing the ship to leave, the
head ofthe guerrilla group indicated that there would be no interference
Admiral Hardy
on any future occasion if$15,000 would be paid to
before.
During 195455, and again in 1958, China tried to break the
blockade.
Beginning in November 1949, the U.S. had imposed an embargo on
strategic materials to the PRC, eventually led by the Coordinating
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM). In 1951,
Congress adopted the Battle Actto cut economic and military aid to
allies and neutral countries that refused to conform. China Committee
(CHINCOM) controls were soon instituted that were even tighter, embar-
During July 1949, one British official based in Hong Kong was highly
complimentary ofthe Nationalist blockade ofChina, concluding that
the blockade is probably the only really effective piece ofwarmaking the
Nationalists have carried out in the last couple ofyears.
From their
naval bases on Taiwan and on dozens ofoffshore islands, the Nationalists
blockaded Chinas coast from Shanghai through south-eastern China;
ters ofChinaTaiwan relations. When the PRC and ROC were actively
considering invading each other during the 1950s, these islands were hotly
contested. Should the PRC ever invade Taiwan, reducing the offshore
islands would almost certainly be part ofany successful military
strategy.
The Nationalists blockade ofthe PRC
The Korean War
To many air power advocates, the Korean War offered a perfect test case for
the efficacy ofblockade. With the United Nations controlling both the
surface ofthe sea and, after the opening days, the air over the theater as
well, UN air and sea power seemed poised to cut the enemys supply lines
13A Failed Blockade
Air and Sea Power in Korea,
Malcolm Muir Jr.
Chinese army achieved both strategic and tactical surprise and, before
running out ofsteam, drove the UN back past the original start line. The
Figure 13.1
Timeline for the Korean War
forces. Beginning on 16 February 1951, UN troops occupied some ofthe
small islands in the harbor; from these, observers could monitor and call
fire upon Communist rail and road traffic coming down the main routes
on the eastern side ofthe peninsula. U.S. naval aviation and surface
warships thus brought their armaments to bear under very favorable condi-
tions. Active Communist countermeasures consisted ofgunfire from shore
ships. Although no big ship was badly damaged, U.S. officers concluded that
it was only a matter oftime before the enemy scored a crippling hit on a
smaller, unarmored warship such as a destroyer.
Such a warship, steaming
out ofcontrol in the narrow confines ofWonsan harbor, was almost certain
Because ofthis hazard, much ofthe navys gunfire was directed, not at
cutting Communist supply lines, but at neutralizing the enemys artillery.
Although destroyer batteries could disperse repair parties and harass enemy
command posts, the lighter guns generally proved ineffective against the
dug-in Communist artillery emplacements; thus, battleships and cruisers
repeatedly counterpunched at enemy batteries.
In fact, by 1953, the larger
stations so much so that morale suffered.
The 861-day siege concluded only with the truce that ended hostilities; in
fact, the last shells were fired by the destroyer
a few moments before
the 2200 cease fire deadline on 27 July 1953 took effect.
In some ways,
Wonsan exemplified in miniature the entire Korean War, in that the siege
dragged on interminably with UN gunners keeping the enemy under heavy
bombardment, while the Communists maintained their transportation lines
by unremitting effort.
Operation
Strangle
Wonsan, important in its own right, was only part ofthe larger effort aimed
1944 with the identical name and objective had aimed to cut the supply lines
ofGerman troops in Italy. That effort, carried out over terrain quite similar
to that ofNorth Korea, had failed to deliver decisive results.
History in this instance proved prescient. The Korean version of
Operation
Strangle
quickly ran into difficulties. The U.S. Air Force calcu-
lated that the front-line enemy forces required 2,400 tons ofsupply daily,
peninsula, while the Air Force carried the burden against the western side of
Overall, the campaign against bridges in North Korea proved disappointing,
in large part due to the highly effectiveenemy repair efforts.
And ifdowning bridges brought only momentary advantage, even less
productive were attacks on roads and railroad tracks. The latter presented a
one January 1953 report summarized: Despite the incessant efforts ofthe
Navy and Air Force, interdiction ofthe enemy lines ofcommunication by
aircraft was a costly and militarily unrewarding extension ofthe war. In
than that ofall the enemys vehicles, rolling stock, and supplies
destroyed. While the cost ofthe war assumes fantastic proportions to
Ifthis was true, the Air Force had not supported him well enough. And
the blockade has helped push North Korea to accept a negotiated peace.
The airmens efforts had bled the enemy severely, but the campaign simply
did not deliver the decisive results that its advocates promised. As the
Navy aptly concluded, Primitive transportation systems combined with
masses ofcoolie labor successfully defied a colossal effort by modern
machines ofwar.
Air and sea power in Korea
During the past four decades, analysing the historical events related to the
Cuban Missile Crisis ofOctober 1962 has provided a veritable cottage
industry for historians ofthe Cold War and for political scientists studying
crisis behavior. This chapter is based in part on documentary materials that
have become available during the past few years. It will argue that the
Kennedy Administrations imposition ofa blockade around Cuba in the
14The Cuban Missile Crisis
Jeffrey G. Barlow*
Rodion Malinovsky. As the two men walked along a Black Sea beach,
Malinovsky pointed across the water toward Turkey and explained that
on the island, nor was there evidence ofoffensive weapons such as surface-
to-surface missiles. Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise,
he emphasized.
But by this point Khrushchev had too much personally
invested in the missile deployment to back down, and he agreed to have the
weapons, particularly offensive ones, ifthats the way we pitched it before the
world.
Kennedy at first was unconvinced, remarking that it wouldnt elimi-
nate the missiles or aircraft already in Cuba.
However, as the session went
on he became more enthusiastic. At one point he asked his advisers: Now, to
declare a blockade ofCuba, do we have to declare war on Cuba?When a
17th, revealed an even more dangerous situation existed, giving the USSR a
(COMASWFORLANT) as Commander, Task Force 8183, to carry out
aerial reconnaissance as requested by Commander, Quarantine Force. At 2200
Time (1000 Eastern Daylight Time) the following day. At 1000 on 24 October,
Admiral Dennison established the surface quarantine line on an arc 500 miles
from Cape Maysi, Cuba, from latitude 2730N, longitude 70W to latitude
20N, longitude 65W. This distant line was established to keep the U.S. Navy
twenty-two ships were estimated as being close enough to the island to allow
them to reach Cuba by the end ofOctober. It was just after 0900 that the
Ironically, Kennedy initially had introduced the idea ofa missile trade as
a trial balloon in the ExComm on 18 October, and by Saturday the 27th he
was seriously entertaining the idea oftrading the Jupiter missiles in Turkey
A careful examination ofthe events surrounding the blockade ofCuba
reveals that during its initial days the quarantine did not fully demonstrate
American resolve. The quarantine was an act ofcoercive diplomacy a
Therefore, it was probably in the beliefthat he had to head offan imme-
diate invasion ofCuba, rather than not as a direct response to the blockade,
15Naval Blockades during the
the Pacific,has left it vulnerable to seaborne invasion while also providing
a ready means oftransportation.
U.S. Navy Efforts to Block Maritime Infiltration
The U.S. Navy operation to prevent infiltration and resupply by sea was
known as
forces in the blockaded area.
The navy had long been urging such an
action. After seven years ofdirect U.S. participation in the SEASIAN
conflict and continued attempts by U.S. military authorities to gain permission
Marine Corps A-6 and U.S. Navy A-7E aircraft from
Coral Sea
dropped the
first thirty-six mines in Haiphongs shipping channel. Externally carried,
Despite all ofits initial problems,
All told, the helicopter crews flew 1,100 hours ofminesweeping duty. This
operation began on 6 February and ended on 27 July 1973.
Directly,
The Beira Patrol theatre ofoperation
16The Beira Patrol
Britains Broken Blockade against
Richard A. Mobley*
Malawi (once Nyasaland) in July and Zambia (the former Northern
Rhodesia) in October. London feared that the minority whites ofSouthern
Rhodesia would ignore domestic and international pressure for black-
majority rule by establishing Southern Rhodesia as a white-controlled state.
In October 1964, Prime Minister Harold Wilson outlined certain precondi-
tions for granting the colony independence: unimpeded progress toward
majority rule; guarantees against unconstitutional amendment ofthe 1961
constitution supporting majority rule; an immediate improvement ofthe
political status ofnon-whites; progress toward cessation ofracial discrimi-
boys two destroyers or frigates at any one time (until the last months of
the operation) carried the burden ofthe surface blockade.
The warships, operating twenty to forty miles offBeira, were to intercept
desired that commanding officers be given a clear understanding that any
force used must be kept to a minimum.
Britains Broken Blockade against Rhodesia
Defence Ministry guidance to Flag Officer Middle East had assumed that
a tankers flag state would give Britain permission to divert the ship. A week
after the prime minister expressed his concerns, the Defence Ministry modi-
fied its guidelines; now, ifa tanker refused to turn away when challenged, a
boarding party would warn the master, in the name ofthe vessels flag state,
to change course. Ifthat did not work, a shot across the bow was autho-
rized. Gone was any option ofcommandeering the ship. Indeed, ifa tanker
absolutely refused to comply, the warship could only escort it, and then only
to the Mozambican six-mile territorial limit. In other words, the tanker
could proceed to Beira unhindered.
These modified rules ofengagement tightened up considerably on 9 April
1966, when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 221. The unusual
voyage of
Joanna V
, which had drawn British attention in early March, had
ended on 5 April in a highly embarrassing way the Greek-flag tanker had
entered Beira, unmolested, under escort by the frustrated HMS
Plymouth
and with wide publicity. The day before, the frigate had attempted to
Joanna V
to go to another port, but since Greece refused permis-
sion to divert it,
Plymouth
could not use force.
Legal advisers warned that Britain would be liable ifit attempted to
force a diversion without permission ofthe flag state. On 7 April they clar-
ified that use offorce must be in accordance with an appropriate Chapter
VII resolution. That same day, the Commonwealth Relations Office sent a
message to all British embassies that Britain would seek an emergency
stop vessels carrying oil to Beira.
Over the next several days the United
Kingdom lobbied furiously in the Security Council for a new resolution
that would give a stronger legal basis for its embargo. It argued that
continued seaborne deliveries ofoil were a threat to peace because, ifsanc-
tions failed, violence might erupt in southern Africa. Britain argued that,
under Chapter VII ofthe UN Charter, preventing the blockades failure
might justify the use offorce, a similar argument to that used at the begin-
ning ofthe Korean War.
The British drew up a resolution that would limit the risk ofescalation. It
confined the blockade to Beira only and specifically authorized only the
United Kingdom to employ force. The resolution called upon Portugal not
to permit oil to be pumped through the pipeline from Beira to Rhodesia
and not to receive at Beira oil destined for Rhodesia.All states were to
ensure the diversion ofany oftheir vessels reasonably believed to be
carrying oil destined for Rhodesia which may be en route for Beira.
passed as UNSCR 221, had the unintended and costly effect offorcing the
Royal Navy to maintain the nine-year blockade alone.
With this resolution, the Defence Ministry liberalized the rules ofengage-
ment but continued to limit the use offorce to the very minimum.
Ministry approval would still be required for the diversion ofvessels, and
the Royal Navy had to remain outside Mozambiques territorial waters. The
Royal Navy felt, however, that Mozambiques six-mile limit was problematic.
Soon after the Security Council issued its new resolution, the Defence
Ministry advised Prime Minister Wilson that it was possible for a tanker to
transit to Beira from Durban, South Africa, entirely within South African,
and then Mozambican, territorial waters. Fortunately, no pirate tanker
ever tried to challenge the Beira blockade in this way. Had one taken advan-
requests, but it exposes the Royal Navy to the risk ofinternational discredit
to their jurisdiction give advance notification to any [British] diplomatic or
consular missions ofa proposed call on Beira by an oil tanker.
The new
rules ofengagement were apparently sufficient, since there were no more
attempts to disregard the Royal Navy blockade ofBeira and no further
major revisions to the rules ofengagement.
The End ofthe Beira Patrol
The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force conducted the blockade professionally,
but the largely ineffectual operation became increasingly unpopular within
the Defence Ministry, which raised persuasive arguments about the costs of
the patrol for a nation that had decided to end its commitments east of
Suez. The government and the vocal Conservative opposition were also well
greater than the concrete costs ofconducting it. Even the Defence Ministry
acknowledged that Rhodesia had to expend more foreign exchange moving
oil by rail from Loureno Marques than it would have had the
BeiraUmtali pipeline been open.
The role ofthe news media proved critically important. At first overcon-
fident about the speed with which sanctions could take effect, the Wilson
Richard A. Mobley
A tremendous number ofbooks have examined the 1982 Falklands War.
chapter will focus on the Argentine and British naval blockades during this war.
In particular, the 1982 British blockade ofthe Falkland Islands has been called
by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt the classic example ofmodern limited blockade.
After considering the historical background to the Falklands War, and exam-
ining some ofthe technological innovations that made the British blockade a
success, naval blockades importance to limited wars will be evaluated.
Background
The Falkland Islands (known in Argentina as the
some 200 islands ofvarious sizes spread over an area some 400 miles to the
east and slightly south ofthe Argentine coast. The two largest islands, East
and West Falkland, dominate the 4,700-square-mile archipelago. A British
colony since 1833, during the early 1980s the islands provided a frontier exis-
tence for approximately 1,800 British citizens, with over a thousand ofthem
living in Port Stanley, the capital, located on East Falkland Island.
The Falkland Islands have a long and complicated history ofownership.
They were first sighted in 1592, and in 1598 were originally named the
Sebald Islands by the Dutch. However, in 1690 Captain John Strong of
Welfare
17SLOCs and Sidewinders
The 1982 Falklands War
Charles W. Koburger Jr.
Falkland Islands as British Dependent Territoriescitizens, which
restricted their right to enter and live in the UK. While the islanders were
traditionally called kelpersdue to the large quantities ofkelp they cut and
shipped, in Argentina the word soon acquired the additional meaning of
second-class citizens. The military junta ruling Argentina in 1982, consid-
ering invasion, perhaps assumed that Britain would not be interested in
The Falklands War
strategic focus had shifted to Patagonia, the Sub-Antarctic and the South
The Seizure: Operation
Rosario
On 28 March 1982, Argentina launched the operation to recover its
terra
irrendenta
, the Malvinas. Two naval task forces departed Puerto Belgrano,
the Argentine Navys main base 300 miles south ofBuenos Aires, and osten-
sibly headed north-east to participate in exercises with the Uruguayan Navy.
Their ultimate course, however, proved to be to the south-east and their
actual mission was the seizure ofthe Falkland Islands.
The two main naval units involved included a carrier task force (TF 20)
built around the light aircraft carrier
25 de Mayo
and including four
destroyers, an oiler, and a seagoing tug. Embarked on the carrier were four
S-2 ASW planes, eight A-4 attack planes, and several helicopters. An
amphibious task force (TF 40) was built around the landing ship
and two personnel transports, escorted by two destroyers and two
force coming from the south-west via Chile, after transitting the Straits of
Magellan. The first threat was countered by the carrier and her escorts
stationed 450 miles to the north ofthe Falklands, while the second was
covered by the cruiser and her escorts stationed to the south-west ofthe
other major ships. An oiler had even been sent ahead ofthe task group, and
so was already on station to refuel whatever was sent in its wake. Of
course,
the degree and speed ofmobilization
gave credence
to Argentine
protests
that Britain was already mobilizing when Argentina decided to occupy the
Islands.
Following the successful Argentine landing on the Falklands, the light
vertical or short runway takeoffand landing (VSTOL) carriers
Invincible
their decks lined with VSTOL Sea Harrier fighter-bombers and
Sea King helicopters departed the UK. By the time they reached Argentinas
Breaking the Argentine naval blockade ofthe Falklands was the first and
most logical tactical action that the British Navy could take, and this was
largely accomplished by early May. The British then enforced a 200-mile
exclusion zone oftheir own. Their goal was to use ships and planes to seal
offthe islands from reinforcement, and they later added an air quarantine
and an electronic black-out. This cut offthe Argentine troops garrisoned on
the islands from their supply lines, and allowed the British to soften them
upat their leisure.
The political clock was still ticking, however, with several states beginning
to organize support for an armistice. Meanwhile, the British public eagerly
awaited action.
The harsh winter was also just around the corner, necessi-
tating rapid action on the part ofthe British Navy. For these reasons, a
rapid and tight naval blockade ofthe Falklands took on a new importance.
The Impact ofthe Naval Blockade
On 12 April 1982, the British government announced that it would enforce a
maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) around the Falkland Islands, and on 30 April,
a total exclusion zone (TEZ) was put into effect. Any ship further than twelve
miles from Argentinas shores was in a General Warning Area. By 7 May,
following the sinking of
General Belgrano
, which took place outside ofthe
TEZ but within the warning area, the Admiralty extended the TEZ to within
twelve miles ofthe Argentine coastline, making it clear that any Argentine
warship outside ofthis twelve-mile limit would be considered hostile.
However, in line with Article 51 ofthe UN Charter, which empowered Britain
to act in self-defense, at no point was an attack on the enemys air bases
authorized or undertaken,which granted the Argentine Navy and Air Force
outside ofArgentine waters.
However, this military action did force the
raid was carried out by forty-five SAS troops against the Argentine grass
airstrip at Pebble Island, destroying all eleven Argentine aircraft while they
were still on the ground. In addition, they destroyed a large surveillance
radar installation, as well as fuel and ammunition dumps, which left the way
clear for the amphibious invasion ofthe islands that took place a week later,
on 21 May.
Now that Argentinas ability to enforce its blockade had been destroyed,
British forces began to enforce their own 200-mile total exclusion zone. A
fewer than twelve times and successfully hit six frigates. According to one
eyewitness, it was only the fact that so many bombs had failed to explode
that prevented an unimaginable scale ofcarnage.
Once forces had embarked on land, they moved eastward across East
Falkland Island toward Port Stanley. Stanley fell on 15 June, and exactly a
month later all ofthe Argentine forces had been removed from the Falkland
Islands; on that very day, the first snow ofwinter also fell on Port Stanley.
On 22 July, the British blockade was officially lifted, although a 150-mile
Falkland Islands Protection Zone (FIPZ) was declared to replace it.
Argentine ships were requested to remain at least 150 miles offthe islands
unless they had particular business to conduct there, which would require
special permission from the British authorities to land.
The Effectiveness ofBlockade in Limited Wars
The very rapidity ofthis limited conflict, which began on 28 March and
ended on 15 July, meant that the British naval blockade which officially
lasted from 12 April to 22 July had to be carried out using extreme
measures. There was no time to board ships, inspect cargos, or provide
warnings; any ship or aircraft that violated Britains total exclusion zone
around the Falklands was fired on and destroyed on sight. With the sole
exception ofnever closing down the Port Stanley airfield, the blockade
successfully kept out Argentine ships and planes. In addition, there was a
tremendous psychological impact that undermined the morale ofthe
Argentine troops, with the Argentine garrison at Port Stanley undergoing
almost constant naval shelling and aerial bombing.
The success ofthe British naval blockade in a limited war was due to
As shown by the Falklands War where the respective forces that could
have been brought to bear were roughly equal the critical factor soon
became air power, and in particular naval air power. It was the ability to
project naval air power, even 8,000 miles from its home ports, in the face of
superior shore-based air power which gave the British Navy the means to
establish local, albeit temporary, sea control, sufficient to ensure partial
blockade ofthe Argentine coast and a total blockade ofthe Falkland
Islands. That said, the loss ofeven one ofthe two British VSTOL carriers
could have effectively ended that blockade and left the conflict permanently
deadlocked. According to Admiral Woodward, he had decided well in
advance ofthe fighting that any major damage to
Invincible
(our vital second deck), would probably cause us to abandon the entire
Falkland Islands operation.
Finally, in Operation
Corporate
the Royal Navy brought to the Falklands
many centuries ofnaval tradition and experience. Task Force 317 appears to
have been ready for action, and was prepared to undertake any task its polit-
ical leaders asked ofit. No matter how good its aircraft and missiles were on
The protracted effort to enforce United Nations sanctions against a virtually
Iraqi combat power to the extent that it could not provide effective conven-
tional resistance to the coalition forces in the 2003 conflict. Therefore, the
focus ofthis chapter is not on the tangled politics ofthe UN efforts to
control Iraq,
but on the maritime aspects ofthe sanctions program, in
which there remain significant lessons to be learned.
Background to the Sanctions
The blockade ofIraq originated in one ofthe earliest international
measures taken against Iraqs invasion ofKuwait on 2 August 1990. Four
days after the Iraqi attack, the United Nations Security Council passed
Resolution 661, which forbade the export ofcargo from either Iraq or
Kuwait and prohibited the import ofany cargo other than medical supplies
and vital foodstuffs.
Iraq is an almost wholly land-locked country, with limited access to the sea
18Maritime Sanctions
Enforcement against Iraq,
James Goldrick*
with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey, constitute important avenues
for trade, including the export ofoil through fixed pipelines. Iraq also has the
benefit ofwhat is practically an alternate access to the sea via the short land
route across Jordan to the latters port ofal-Aqabah at the north-eastern head
ofthe Red Sea. In view ofJordans lack ofcooperation with the sanctions in
1990, the Red Sea had to be included in the maritime interception from the
Persian Gulftheatre ofoperations
Henry H. Mauz, the Commander ofU.S. Navy forces in theater. It soon
became clear that, while all concerned were willing to accept an American
lead and coordinating role, France and Italy desired separate arrangements.
The formula eventually arrived at was one described as loose association
within which the Maritime Interception Force (MIF)
would operate.
Four major areas were initially assigned. The U.S. deployed forces to all but
the GulfofAden, which was the responsibility ofFrance. In the Red Sea, the
Americans were joined by the French, Greeks, and Spanish. Major effort was
centered on the GulfofOman, to which Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada,
boarding parties. The third, and probably most important, was the use of
helicopters for rapid insertion.
The key problem remained that offorcing compliance without resorting to
direct fire. This was never allowed for many compelling reasons. Casualties
amongst unarmed passengers or merchant seamen would too easily surrender
the moral high-ground to Iraq. Large merchant vessels were very difficult to
disable except with large-calibre weapons which greatly increased the risk of
casualties and the coalition had no desire to be saddled with a large-scale
search and rescue operation or with the environmental damage that sinking a
ship would almost certainly imply. Physical measures other than gunnery also
carried the risk ofdisabling a ship to the point where it would become a
hazard to navigation or even, within the Persian Gulfitself, to oil platforms.
Graunching, or bringing the arresting warship directly alongside the merchant
vessel, had been utilized as recently as 194647 with the British attempts to
prevent Jewish immigration to Palestine, but even then had resulted in
substantial damage.
Stoutly built Australian patrol boats had successfully
employed the technique on fishing vessels in the 1970s, but it was not a practi-
Kuwait. The coalition was aware that the blockade was not airtightand
there was no sign ofany wavering ofIraqi resolve. Nevertheless, by the end
of1990, the coalition could be confident that it had largely cut Iraq offfrom
the world economy.
Given the latters dependence on external suppliers for
practically all its combat forces, as well as much ofits national infrastruc-
ture, the erosion ofIraqi strength had begun.
The greatest political challenge to the embargo came on 26 December
1990, when the MIF intercepted the propaganda peace ship
en route from Algeria to Iraq. By this time, the multinational forces were
effectively coordinated and the basic procedures thoroughly understood.
The vessel was boarded and taken over by special forces and marines,
Although the lull in commerce within the Gulfcontinued in the first
months after the 1991 war, there were soon signs ofreviving activity.
Resumption ofinterception operations also brought into focus the demands
ofthe Red Sea and Persian Gulfenvironment. The initial effort had started in
late autumn 1990 and continued throughout the winter of199091. However,
although storms, restricted visibility, and the steep seas ofthe winter months
could make life difficult for naval forces, the heat and humidity ofthe summer
proved even more difficult. Machinery and cooling systems struggled to
operate effectively. The operational performance ofhelicopters was drastically
reduced, while the physical demands ofboarding large merchant ships
particularly when substantial numbers ofcontainers required examination
led all too quickly to fatigue and heat stress. For the next decade and beyond,
the summer remained the most difficult period ofthe year for the maritime
evading large warships. Holding areas for suspect vessels had initially to be
established in the central Gulf, well away from the approaches to Iraq, and
much MIF effort was taken up escorting suspect vessels there.
The progressive reduction in the mine and missile threat and the more
cooperative Iraqi attitude implicit in accepting Resolution 986 allowed some
changes in the MIF arrangements from 1997 onward. An anchorage was
established in the northern Gulfinto which all vessels inbound to or
outbound from Iraqi ports were directed for examination. This also became
the holding area for any apprehended illegal traffic.
Other than oil for foodtankers which were loaded at the Minh Al Bakr
offshore terminal (MABOT) under UN supervision all legal outbound
vessels were in ballast and thus relatively easy to check. One technique was to
ask empty bulk carriers to open their cargo hatches for visual inspection by
helicopter. Laden inbound bulk carriers also presented few problems, but the
business ofchecking container ships was wearisome. Container ships were
soon given a series ofguidelines for cargo stacking and spacing to allow rela-
additional air-to-air missiles and one artillery shipment in the early 1990s. It
also may have received some significant shipments ofspare parts during
However, not all ofthese items would have come in by sea
and they did not, even cumulatively, represent the scale ofsupply that was
required to rebuild Iraqs military. The systematic search program had a
substantial preventative effect, therefore, one that was obvious by the late
1990s; scholars agreed that substantial disarmament ofIraq had already
been achieved.
This assessment was confirmed by the state ofIraqs armed
forces in the 2003 conflict.
One issue ofconcern was the effect ofthe sanctions program on the
people ofIraq. While some observers noted the reluctance with which Iraq
adopted the oil for foodprogram in the first place, and its continuing
failure to utilize the funding available for humanitarian materials or, when
permitted, the items needed for rebuilding national infrastructure, there were
The Smuggling Problem
However watertight the monitoring ofinward movement oflarge cargoes
appeared, the MIF faced much greater difficulty in preventing smuggling
out ofIraq. The maritime problem would take more than a decade to solve
Despite the benefits which the Iranian Revolutionary Guard derived, it
the coast. Smugglers realized the danger that being in international waters
created for them. The boarding process was thus increasingly a race against
time, since the boarders had either to seize control or disembark before the
smugglers entered or re-entered Iranian territorial waters. The smugglers were
not violent, but they would do everything short ofviolence to hinder arrest.
As boarding teams became more expert, the number ofphysical barriers
loading activity in October 2001 100,000 tons, ofwhich 35,000 were inter-
cepted by the MIF with that ofOctober 2002, in which only 3,000 tons
were loaded and no less than 5,000 intercepted. This meant that much ofthe
intercepted oil came from old loadings.
The next move was against the dhows. To avoid the problem ofmaintaining
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Turkey would never condone smuggling of
strategic materials into Iraq, while Iran and Syria had their own national
interests to worry about. As for Iraqs alternate access to the sea through
Jordan, this was just as susceptible to maritime interception and control as
the Persian Gulf.
The sustained enforcement ofthe sanctions over thirteen years clearly ate
away at the Iraqi war machine, while it also substantially assisted in ham-
stringing whatever plans Saddam Hussein might have had for resuming the
production ofweapons ofmass destruction. That there was collateral
damage to Iraqs economy is also clear, but, certainly from the early 1990s
onward the blame for this must be placed on Saddams refusal to accept UN
conditions for opening up exports and imports.
The blockade ofIraq was never perfect, but the thousands ofboardings and
inspections that the MIF conducted were effective not so much in what they
discovered, but in what they prevented. The presence ofthe MIF, particularly
after it had adopted the policy offorward deployment and close blockade, also
had a vital effect in preventing any interference with the movement ofshipping
to and from Kuwait before and during the 2003 War. The achievement ofsea
control, which was the main enabler for sanctions enforcement, was also key to
the coalitions ability to project and sustain power on land.
The fact that largely seaborne mechanisms were available for such a
purpose was itselfa vital feature ofthe campaign. The coalition naval forces
inherently created a much smaller footprint within the region than land
forces would have, which was important for regional states whose strategic
interests had to be balanced very carefully against a range ofdomestic
factors. The limited commitment involved also meant that the coalition of
nations willing to make a contribution to sanctions enforcement remained
large and relatively diverse, which was an important source ofsupport for
the United States in particular. It is difficult to envisage any alternative
The March 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis
East Asia was thrown into a major political crisis in March 1996, when
China conducted a program ofballistic missile testsclose to Taiwans
major ports.
In fact, the missile launches were not strictly tests at all. Rather,
they represented a military campaign to force Taiwan to bend to Chinas will.
Although no blood was spilled, the crisis could have spiraled out ofcontrol
and ignited a wider, deadlier conflict. At the time, many news reporters and
officials claimed that Chinas campaign ofmilitary coercion equated to some
new form ofmissileblockade ofthe island. Thus, the missile launches were
variously described in the media and by Western experts as a de facto,
partial,temporary,or coldblockade.
It is worthwhile revisiting the missile blockade concept given the leading
role Beijing assigns to a blockade strategy in its military options for dealing
with Taiwan. Although much has been written about the crisis since 1996,
there has been little strategic analysis ofthe missile blockade question.
19Ballistic Missiles in Chinas
Anti-Taiwan Blockade Strategy
Chris Rahman
March 1996 presidential elections, as well as to halt any drive by the island
to declare formal independence. The genesis ofthe crisis, however, was
firmly rooted in the increasingly divergent paths followed by the two Chinas
since the mid-1980s, with Taiwans democratization and the consequent
emergence ofa separate, Taiwanese national consciousness contrasted with
a China that emphasized economic and military modernization coupled
with Chinese nationalism; China has exhibited a growing ambition to
election, the first such election in the islands history. Those warnings
included messages channeled through intermediaries to Washington. The
6,500 square miles, meaning that sea passage through the Strait and air
traffic were partly obstructed the usable breadth ofthe Strait was effec-
March, shipping was forced to re-route to avoid the splash zones, adding up
Taiwans trading activities. Bunker fuel prices rose in Hong Kong, Singapore,
and South Korea as shipowners diverted their vessels to bunker in those
countries rather than risk sailing to Taiwan.
Some companies began to source
goods especially electronic components from other countries rather than
take the gamble on Taiwan being able to continue supply.
Moreover, the effect on shipping was perhaps greater than claimed by
some industry sources. All shipping and air traffic that was forced to divert
incurred increased fuel costs, and any delays due to diversions or cancella-
tions would have incurred costs elsewhere along the production chain. The
primary reason why shipping and insurance rates did not rise is that the
the exercises been sustained for a longer period, with a commensurate nega-
tive economic impact on Taiwan.
Operationally, the blockade may have been a moderate success, but strate-
gically the intervention ofthe United States probably gave the Chinese
restricted the third round ofMarch exercises, even forcing the cancellation
ofsome parts.
The exercises latter, amphibious landing phase may have
been defeated resoundingly and realistically by bad weather.
A third possible factor was that the partial blockadeeffect ofBeijings
economic warfare campaign was rebounding to create a significant negative
impact on Hong Kong, which Beijing had been trying to placate before its
ofTaiwanese identity and the search for international recognition has
continued and even expanded since the crisis. The crisis also created
precisely the type ofinternational reaction that China did not want from the
United States and Japan, its principal major power rivals in East Asia.
In April 1996, Japan and the United States issued a joint declaration on
security, including an agreement to revise their bilateral defense cooperation
guidelines. The new guidelines, issued by Tokyo in 1997, included a provision
for cooperation in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an
important influence on Japans peace and security.
response to Chinese criticism, that the provision was situationalrather than
geographic, a number ofstatements by Japanese officials implied that the new
defense cooperation guidelines will be applicable to future Taiwan contingen-
the Taiwanese economy, with a joint editorial ofthe Communist Partys
Peoples Daily
and the PLAs
Liberation Army Daily
declaring that, ifTaiwan
did not buckle to Chinas demands, there would be no future for Taiwan to
speak ofsince the Taiwan economy is characterized by a lack ofraw mate-
Operation Relex theatre ofoperations
Federal involvement in civil coastal surveillance began in 1967. This
followed a request from the then Department ofPrimary Industry for
surveillance ofAustralias newly declared twelve-nautical-mile fishing zone.
Thereafter Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) aircraft and RAN patrol
boats conducted occasional patrols, but these irregular activities had only a
Washington D.C.s Pentagon.
On this day the Norwegian container ship MV
Tampa
rescued 438 men, women, and children from the Indian Ocean north-
west ofAustralia. Apart from the five-member Indonesian crew, most of
those rescued were Afghan nationals who claimed asylum.
In Australian official jargon the people rescued by
Tampa
were suspected
unauthorized non-citizens (SUNCs). On 27 August, immigration authorities
directed the captain ofthe ship to keep out ofthe nations territorial waters
and to take his passengers back to Indonesia. August had already been a
busy month, with 3,600 unauthorized arrivals in custody and awaiting
Tampa
Since 1999, Coastwatch and the ADF located
129 boats carrying unauthorized arrivals in or approaching Australian
waters, some with as many as 350 passengers. Almost all sought refugee
status, and most claimed to have come from either Iraq or Afghanistan,
perhaps after paying US$5,000 or more to make the passage from the
Middle East to Australia. Unlike the Indo-Chinese refugees ofthe late
1970s, the more recent arrivals were well briefed on their legal rights, and
had received coaching on what questions they might be asked and how they
should respond. As such, there was a view among many authorities that the
Tampa
crisis offered the Australian
prime minister an opportunity to impose a hard-line political response in the
lead-up to the 2001 federal election. Aware that several more SIEVs
(suspected illegal entry vessels) carrying upwards of900 people were due to
enter Australian waters at any time, the government loudly announced its
intention to control the flow ofpeople coming into the country. The central
aim ofthe developing border protection policy was to prevent any ofthese
unauthorized arrivals from even landing on Australian soil.
The new border protection regime included several different aspects.
Changes to immigration laws resulted in the excising ofcertain islands from
Australias migration zone, further ensuring that there was no legal right of
entry through these territories. More cooperation was sought from
Indonesian political and law enforcement authorities, while activities by the
command ofthe operation to Rear-Admiral GeoffSmith, dual-hatted as the
Naval Component Commander ofHQAST and the Maritime Commander.
An attempt to lead the activity from afloat proved unnecessary, and tactical
control ofthe operation eventually passed into the hands ofCommander
Northern Command, Brigadier Mike Silverstone, based in Darwin.
the incoming SIEVs. The navys task was to use every reasonable means to
prevent unathorized arrivals from having access to the Australian migration
zone. As the navy had no authority to board vessels in international waters,
SIEV was turned northwards. The master signalled to the boarding party that
his life would be in jeopardy ifhe did not turn back towards Australia and this
he did as soon as the boarding party departed for the second time. On the
third boarding, those in the SIEV became abusive, smashing the wheelhouse
windows and directing threats at the boarding party.
Unwilling to escalate the situation, Menhinick withdrew his boarding
party. The next morning those in the SIEV were finally persuaded to stop
their transit south when promised medical supplies, food, and water.
Warramunga
during the first few weeks of
Relex
, as were those skills connected with
seamanship, information handling, and surface picture compilation. There
were also specific advantages in using larger high-capability platforms for
interception. The practical aspects ofcommand and control ofdispersed
board the SIEV were forced to enter the water.
exemplary rescue using the ships liferafts and flotation aids, and without
any injury or loss oflife, but the Senate Committee which later looked into
Operation
Relex
expressed concern.
In circumstances such as those faced by
Warramunga
potential for success or disaster depended absolutely on the commanding
officers judgement. Much ofthe controversy generated by the sinking of
SIEV 4 revolved around the records and recollections ofa brieftelephone
the maritime response strategy developed by Australia during Operation
Relex
is worthy ofrecall, not because it may be applicable elsewhere which
will depend on individual circumstances but rather because, like a weather
vane, the operation points to some ofthe challenges navies face in the
twenty-first century.
Whatever may be said about the local political imperative to demonstrate
strong leadership, there can be no doubt that by asserting its right to enforce
national sovereignty far out to sea Australia took an effective stand against
a previously uncontrolled problem. It is clear from subsequent developments
that the Australian government considers the RAN has a greater role to play
in the enforcement requirements arising from the surveillance ofits offshore
estate. With legal developments relating to fish stocks and continental shelf
claims generating comparable requirements worldwide, it seems reasonable
to suggest that other governments may reach similar conclusions.
Many questions still remain unasked and unresolved, but the militarys
tradition ofservice allows it to be used in ways hardly possible with other
agencies. Since few nations have the resources to maintain a navy solely
dedicated to high-intensity war, this is unlikely to be the last reverse
blockade.
Sealing Australias maritime borders
PART IV
Contemporary Blockade
Strategy
Through the centuries major changes have taken place in the ability of
states to prevent the movement ofships or particular goods over the sea
lanes ofthe world. Some ofthe changes have been wrought by techno-
logical evolution, some by increasing importance ofseaborne trade, and
some by alterations in the structure ofinternational relations. The
combined effect has profoundly affected both the way maritime block-
ades are conducted in the twenty-first century and the means employed.
In large measure, it has also rendered the traditional law ofblockade
21Technology and Naval
Yale Law Journal
article written in 1991, Michael Fraunces
presciently wrote:
In the future blockade may become even more important as the need of
a blockading state to stop every merchant ship grows more vital. The
recent willingness ofostensibly neutral states to supply not simply tech-
nical know-how and materials for weapons construction, but also
ready-for-use missiles and other decisive weapons, to the highest bidder
portends such a future. As the negative consequences ofallowing even
one ship to pass uninspected grow more severe, blockading states will
become more willing to use the new blockade forms [long-range
blockade and blockade zones] at the expense ofneutral interests.
What Fraunces could not have foreseen, happened on 11 September 2001 an
Strategy,in which he wrote: Whatever the number ofships needed to
watch those in an enemys port, they are fewer by far than those that will be
required to protect the scattered interests imperiled by an enemys escape.
In Mahans time, ships carried all ofthe international trade that took
Work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities to accom-
plish these objectives and work to strengthen international law and
frameworks.
Not transport or assist in the transport ofany cargoes ofWMD, their
delivery systems or related materials to or from countries or groups of
proliferation concern.
Board and search any suspect vessels flying their flags in their internal
waters, territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas ofany other
state.
Consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and
searching oftheir own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of
such WMD-related cargoes.
Stop and/or search suspect vessels in their internal waters, territorial
seas, or contiguous zones, and enforce conditions on suspect vessels
entering or leaving their ports, internal waters, or territorial seas.
Require suspect aircraft that are transiting their airspace to land for
inspection and seize any such cargoes, and deny aircraft transit rights
through their airspace.
Prevent their ports, airfields, or other facilities from being used as trans-
shipment points for WMD-related cargo.
The CSI narrows the focus to containers that are being shipped to the
United States, and has the following elements:
pre-screening containers before they arrive at US ports;
using technology to pre-screen high-risk containers;
developing and using smartsecure containers.
As ofNovember 2004, the CSI had twenty participating countries with
some thirty-seven ports committed. These include the twenty largest
exporting ports and cover almost two-thirds ofcontainers shipped to the
United States.
As can be seen from the foregoing, over time the
ways
maritime block-
ades have been accomplished and the
for conducting them have
changed dramatically. The objective ofmaritime blockade operations has
remained constant, however: to prevent the movement ofparticular ships
and aircraft, or ofparticular cargoes in ships and aircraft, on or over speci-
fied waters ofthe world excluding inland rivers and seas.
In view ofthe foregoing, this chapter will ofnecessity take a broad view
ofwhat constitutes a blockade.What will be referred to herein as
blockade operationsencompasses those actions contained within the
traditional legal definition ofblockadecited above, but also all others
having the same objective: to prevent the movement ofships or aircraft in
maritime sea areas or in the skies above them, or ofparticular cargoes
(including people) ofthe blockaded party. Clearly, this approach widens the
focus ofwhat constitutes a blockadein the narrow legal sense.
States have been rather inventive over the years in conducting blockade
Reconnaissance and surveillance are critical to the maintenance ofeffec-
tive blockades. At the same time, these tasks have become both more
important and in some ways more difficult: The need to track thousands of
civilian ships worldwide has intensified given the potential for seemingly
harmless shipping to be involved in nuclear, chemical or biological terrorist
Table 21.1
Distance of the horizon
Height (ft)
Nautical miles
3.6
8.1
100
11.4
250
18.1
500
25.6
1,000
36.2
10,000
114.4
30,000
198.1
50,000
255.8
100,000
361.8
since the effects ofdarkness and weather were mitigated, and the human
eyeball was supplemented with electronic imaging.
The ultimate reconnaissance and surveillance platform a geostationary
would-be blockade runners from proceeding. Submarines, likewise, while
very deadly as history has demonstrated have severe limitations with visit
Figure 21.1
Unmanned aircraft capable ofhigh altitude reconnaissance and
surveilance operations
Weapons to prevent the imposition ofa maritime blockade tend to be
similar to those for enforcement. Technologically, weapons for use in
maritime environments have become longer-ranged, more stealthy (which
makes them more difficult to counter), and more accurate. Air-to-surface
weapons have achieved high precision owing to satellite guidance against
How blockade operations to prevent the movement ofships, aircraft,
and their specific cargoes have been conducted, and the means to conduct
them, have changed significantly over time. Technology has been the hand-
maiden ofchange, and, especially recently, it has had to bear the burden of
making blockades operationally effective. As Fraunces makes clear, and as
Naval blockades are never conducted in a political vacuum, but are a
means to contribute to the achievement ofnational goals. What types of
political goals have blockades been most effective at furthering? What
types ofblockades have been employed? What strategic effects have they
delivered? What circumstances are most and least conducive to their oper-
ational and strategic success? What counter-blockade strategies have been
most effective?
These issues will be examined in terms oftime, space, force, goals, enemy
adaptation, and overall effectiveness.
includes both the rate ofimple-
mentation and the duration.
concerns the area under blockade and
the sea and land lines ofcommunications for both sides.
Force
refers to the
available instruments ofnational power.
Objectives
strategic goal for which the blockade was undertaken and the operational
goals ofthe blockade.
Enemy adaptation
includes the blockaded countrys
attempts to adapt to changing circumstances. Finally,
effectiveness
measured on both the strategic and operational level.
Blockade types include close and distant (in terms ofthe distance ofthe
22Conclusions
Naval Blockades and the Future of
Seapower
Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine*
Table 22.1: Time shows how these factors played out in the eighteen case
studies in this volume. Seven rapidly implemented blockades involved sea
powers cutting offland powers or other weaker sea powers. These include
Crimean, first Sino-Japanese, SpanishAmerican, Korean, Cuban Missile,
Falklands, and Iraqi. In all but two ofthese conflicts, rapid blockades were
Table 22.1
Time
Name
Implementation
Duration
Strategic effectiveness

Win/Lose/

Draw
Napoleon
Tightening
Long
No, created
hostile coalition
Lose
War of 1812
Intermittent
Medium
No, created
stronger US Navy
Draw
Crimean
Short
Yes, forced
war termination
Win
USCW
Intermittent
Medium
Yes, stop
naval
development, trade
Win
SJW I
Rapid
Short
Yes, forced
war termination
Win
SpAmWar
Rapid
Short
Yes, forced
war termination
Win
WWI
Tightening
Medium
es, undermine
morale, cut
trade
Win
SJW II
Tightening
Long
No, created
hostile coalition
Lose
WWII
Tightening
Medium
Yes, cut
trade
Win
PRC
Loosening
Long
Yes, prevented
PRC invasion
Draw
Korea
Rapid
Medium
Yes, undermine
morale,
cut
trade
Win
Cuba
Rapid
Short
Yes, USSR
removed
missiles
Win
Vietnam
Tightening
Medium
Yes, forced
war termination
Lose
Rhodesia
Loosening
Long
Yes, isolate
Rhodesia
Draw
Falklands
Rapid
Short
Yes, forced
war termination
Win
Iraq
apid
Long
Yes, prevent
Iraqi
rearmament
Win
PRC mis.
Intermittent
Short
No, create
hostile coalition
Draw
Australia
Tightening
Medium
Yes, reduced
immigrant flow
Draw
Three intermittent blockades War of1812, Civil War, and PRC Missile
with two loosening blockades ROCPRC and Rhodesia were perhaps
most strategically effective in what they prevented from happening; in other
Table 22.2
Space
Name
Blockader
Blockaded
Neighbors
Type
Type
Napoleon
Land power
Sea power
Russia changed
sides
War of 1812
Sea power
Land power
Close
Far
Crimean
Sea powers
Land power
Turkey helps
Close
Far
USCW
Land power
and power
Close
SJW I
Sea power
Land power
Close
SpAmWar
Sea power
Island colony
Close
WWI
Great power
coalition
Land power
Russia falls, US
Distant
SJW II
Sea power
Land power
USSR intervenes
Close
WWII
Great power
coalition
Land power
USSR changes
sides
Distant
PRC
Island sea
power
Land power
US, USSR
intervene
Close
Korea
Great power
coalition
Peninsula
USSR, PRC
intervene
Close
Far
Cuba
Sea power
Island natio
USSR
Distant
Vietnam
Sea power
Land power
USSR, PRC
intervene
Close
Far
Rhodesia
Sea power
Land
locked
Neighboring ports
Close
Far
Falklands
Sea power
Island colony
Close
Far
Iraq
Great power
coalition
Land power
Iran, Jord
an, Syria
help
Close
Far
PRC mis.
Land power
Island nation
US intervenes
Distant
Australia
Sea power
Immigrants
Distant
Sea powers seeking to blockade a country bordering on Russia should
anticipate Russian intervention. Historically, Russia has chosen sides in such
conflicts to open up or close down alternate supply routes and sources of
supplies. In fully halfofall ofthe case studies (nine out ofthe eighteen)
Russian actions have threatened to tip the balance in the blockade effort.
These are: (1) defection from Napoleons continental blockade ofEngland;
(2) defeat in WWI but soon counterbalanced by U.S. participation; (3)
opposition to Japan in the second Sino-Japanese War; (4) cooperating with
the Nazis until attacked in 1941; (5) opposition to the Nationalist blockade
ofChina during the 1950s; (6) opposition to the UN blockade ofKorea; (7)
Naval blockades and the future ofseapower
Table 22.3
Force
Name
Mines
Surface
Bombing
Conquest
Invasion
Land
operations
operations
Napoleon
War of 1812
Crimean
USCW
SJW I
SpAmWar
WWI
SJW II
WWII
ROCPRC
Korea
Cuba
Vietnam
Rhodesia
Falklands
Iraq
PRC mis.
Australia
the enemys sovereign land, sea, or air space. Finally, the duration ofthe
Naval blockades and the future ofseapower
Table 22.4
Goals
Blockade
Operational goal
Strategic goal
Focus
Partial/
Total
Napoleon
Capture coastal
Eur; stop trade
Defeat UK
Trade
Partial
War of 1812
Defeat US Navy
Defeat US
Navy
Partial
Crimean
Cut Russian trade
Get Russia out
of Turkey
Trade
Total
USCW
Cut Southern
trade
Maintain the
Union
Trade
Partial
SJW I
Take key port for
pincer on Beijing
Destroy
Chinese Navy
Navy
Total
SpAmWar
Deny bases to
Spanish Navy
Cuban
independence
Navy
Total
WWI
Deny resources;
bottle up navy
Defend
homeland +
empire
Trade
Partial
SJW II
Support ground
operations to
punish China
China
recognition of
Manchukuo
Trade
Partial
WWII
Deny resources;
bottle up navy
Defeat
Germany
Trade
Partial
PRC
Cut PRC trade,
get forward bases
Reunite China
under KMT
Trade
Partial
Korea
Cut (S)
LOCS
Defeat North
Korea
Army
Partial
Cuba
Cut weapons
imp
orts
Remove
offensive
weapons
Missiles
Total
Vietnam
Cut insurgent and
weapon
flow
Protect South
Vietnam
Army
Partial
Rhodesia
Cut petroleum
imports
Prevent
independence
Trade
Partial
Falklands
Halt resupply
Expel Argentina
Army
Total
Iraq
Cut oil exports
and weapons
imports
Enforce
settlement of
Gulf
War
Trade
Partial
PRC mis.
Cut commerce,
transport
Prevent
independence
Trade
Partial
Australia
Send back boat
people
Prevent illegal
immigration
People
Total
Notes:
U Unlimited
L Limited
C Continental power doing the blockading.
more available and dependable, they too were used for patrol duty. Joint
operations also played an increasingly important role, with joint seaair
operations increasingly substituting for joint landsea operations in the
Finally, while wars ofconquest usually included invasions with the two
notable exceptions being Chinese (the Nationalist blockade ofthe PRC and
the PRC Missile blockade ofTaiwan) where a full-blown invasion would
have been an enormous undertaking land invasions were not necessarily
intended for permanent conquest, but quite often merely for exerting pres-
become a nightmare scenario for the blockading country. However, ifthe
blockaded country either lacks effective counter-measures or does not incor-
porate them in time, then blockades can deliver a quick, decisive victory,
providing a dream scenario for the blockading country. Most naval block-
Table 22.5
Enemy adaptation
Name
Counter
blockade
Third
party
action
Counter
measures
Napoleon
UK started blockade
Russia
defected
from France
UK smuggling
War of 1812
US embargo
of
US s
muggling
Crimean
Russia
reflagging
USCW
South embargo Union
South smuggling
SJW I
SpAmWar
WWI
Unrest
icted sub
warfare
US join
Entente
Alternate LOCs, USSR
SJW II
hinese embargo of
Japan
US, UK help
China
Alternate LOCs, USSR
WWII
German
counter
blockade of UK
Alternate LOCs, USSR
PRC
PRC attack
on Jinmen
and Mazu
Alternate LOCs, USSR
Korea
Alternate LOCs,
USSR
PRC
Cuba
Vietnam
Alternate LOCs,
USSR
PRC
Rhodesia
Alternate LOCs and
SLOCs
Falklands
Iraq
Alternate LOCs,
smuggling
PRC mis.
US deploys
carriers
Australia
Notes:
D Dream
blockade
N Nightmare
blockade
blockade alone. The costs soon exceeded the economic, but not necessarily
the prestige, value to Britain, so the blockade dragged on for almost a decade.
Ofthe five dream scenarios Crimea, first Sino-Japanese War,
SpanishAmerican War, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Falklands in four of
them the theater ofhostilities was small, with the first Sino-Japanese War
reflagged its ships and profited from smuggling to the Continent during the
Napoleonic Wars. In World War I, merchant ships running the blockade were
armed. Long coastlines proved difficult to seal in the War of1812 and the
Civil War. Alternate ports able to handle oil shipments undermined the effec-
tiveness ofthe Beira patrol. Most importantly, alternate land lines of
communication seriously degraded the strategic effectiveness ofmany block-
ades and usually led to protraction, including in both World Wars, the second
Naval blockades and the future ofseapower
Table 22.6
Effectiveness
Name
Alternative
route
Geographical
coverage
Bottleneck
W/L/D
Effect
Napoleon
Blockade
running
Huge
alternate
L
Porous
War of 1812
Blockade
running
Huge
Trade income
D
Porous
Crimean
Crimea, Balti
tech imports,
bulky exports
W
Tight
USCW
Blockade
running
Huge
High tech imports,
bulky exports
W
Porous
SJW I
Weihaiwei
Navy stuck in port
W
Tight
SpAmWar
Island colony
Coal for Spanish
Navy
W
Tight
WWI
Denmark,
Holland
Huge
Food, nitre
W
Porous
SJW II
Vietnam,
Burma
Huge
War materiel
L
Porous
WWII
Occupied
neighbors
Huge
Fuel, rubber
W
Porous
PRC
Blockade
running
Huge
D
Porous
Korea
USSR, PRC
Limited
coastline
W
Porous
Cuba
and nation
W
Tight
Vietnam
PRC, Laos,
Cambodia
Long coastline
L
Porous
Rhodesia
Mozambique
ports
Pipeline port
Petroleum imports
D
Porous
Falklands
Island colony
W
Tight
Iraq
Blockade
running
Short coastline
High tech
imports,
bulky exports
W
Porous
PRC mis.
Blockade
running
Island nation
D
Porous
Australia
Huge
ngoing
Tight
Notes:
W blockader wins
L blockader loses
D draw
smuggling, and alternative land routes undermined the effectiveness ofthe
blockade. However, in all ten cases the blockaders managed to reduce the
flow ofgoods, drive up costs or impose unacceptable burdens on the enemy.
Victory usually resulted not solely from the naval blockade, but from a
combination ofmilitary efforts, including land operations.
Ofthe ten blockades that were part ofsuccessful wars, surprisingly only
four were far blockades conducted by naval powers Crimea, Korea,
Falklands, and Iraq. Success rates increased for sea powers conducting near
blockades, with five ofthis type succeeding. Only Japan failed at a near
blockade in the second Sino-Japanese War, mainly due to the broadening of
the war with the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor to include other sea powers as
its adversaries. As for blockades by land powers, really only the Union
blockade ofthe U.S. South fully achieved its objective ofhalting the expan-
sion ofthe Confederate Navy and eroding the export revenues ofthe South.
In the eight remaining blockades that either failed, or where the goal was
blockade and the PRC Missile blockade being two prime examples. This
Meanwhile, sea powers blockading land powers must take into account
the probability that new land lines ofcommunication can be created to avoid
the greatest effects ofthe blockade; two ofthe three nightmarescenarios
discussed under enemy adaptation were examples ofthis type. Interestingly,
it was Russia/USSR that most often played this role by utilizing its central
geographic position.
The most obvious category ofsuccessful naval blockades involved sea
powers blockading islands, such as Cuba or the Falklands, or isolated penin-
sulas such as the Crimea or Shandong, where blockade had the dual effect of
halting trade and putting military pressure on the enemy. All five ofthe so-
called dreamscenarios fit this description. However, blockades oflarge
peninsulas or coastal states that have adequate land transportation and
in favor ofnew forms ofaerial and space-based weapons, communications,
and highly accurate sensors. As before, seapower will continue to be essential
for sustaining blockades, but the sensing tools that sea powers will use to aid
in the enforcement ofsuch operations will more often be located in the air
and in outer space.
Bruce A. Elleman and S.C.M. Paine
Foreword
*The thoughts and opinions expressed in this Foreword are those ofthe author,
and are not necessarily those ofthe U.S. government, the U.S. Navy
Department, or the Naval War College.
1Richard Pares,
Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights, 17391763
(Oxford: The
Clarendon Press, 1938).
2See titles in Robert Greenhalgh Albion,
Naval & Maritime History: An
Annotated Bibliography.
Fourth Edition, Revised and Expanded (Mystic, CT:
Munson Institute ofAmerican Maritime History, 1972), Section BC-3:
American Civil War, 18611865: The Blockade and Coastal Actions, 25960;
Section BE-7: World War I, 19141918, 1745; Benjamin W. Labaree,
Supplement (19711986) to Robert G. Albions Naval & Maritime History, An
Annotated Bibliography, Fourth Edition.
(Mystic, CT: Munson Institute of
American Maritime Studies, 1988) 1689.
1Department ofthe Navy (Office ofthe ChiefofNaval Operations),
Commanders Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations
, NWP 114M, para. 7.7.1.
3C.J. Colombos,
International Law ofthe Sea
, 6th rev. edn (London, 1967) 818; L.
(ed. H. Lauterpacht), Vol. II, 7th edn (London,
4The law ofblockade is often linked to the law ofneutrality because a blockade
always implies interference with neutral trade. Oppenheim, 768. But blockades
affect neutral countries indirectly, so the law ofblockade is not an integral part
ofthe law ofneutrality. For a characterization ofblockades as acts ofwar, see
M.M. Whiteman,
Digest ofInternational Law
, Vol. 10 (Washington D.C., 1968)
5M.N. Schmitt,
Blockade Law: Research Design and Sources
, Legal Research
Guides, Vol. 12 (Buffalo, 1991) 3.
6W. Schumann,
Die Friedensblockade
(Hamburg, 1974)
; A.H. Washburn,
The Legality ofthe Pacific Blockade,
Columbia Law Review
22741, 44259; Institut de Droit International,
Droit de blocus en temps de paix
AIDI 9 (188788) 275301. Whiteman, 870. For early state practice, see the refer-
ences in H.J.W. Verzijl
17Bynkershoek, 87.
18Colombos, 816.
19Wehberg, 26.
20Jessup/Dek, 117.
21Wehberg, 30.
22P. Fauchille,
47According to the French, notification was constitutive, while for Anglo-
Americans knowledge ofa blockade was sufficient. Colombos, 826; Wehberg,
164; Schramm, 202; Niemeyer, 1247, 1610.
48W.E. Hall,
(Oxford, 1880) 846; Wehberg, 170.
49Schramm, 203; H. Hecker and E. Tomson,
Vlkerrecht und Prisenrecht
(Frankfurt a.m M. and Berlin, 1965) 29.
50Wehberg, 166; Malkin, 93; Tucker, 285.
51The British long-distance blockade was proclaimed by Order-in-Council of11
March 1915 (printed in: Reichs-Marine-Amt,
Seekriegsrecht im Weltkriege,
Sammlung diplomatischer Noten und anderer Urkunden
, [Berlin, 1916], No. 150).
In its note to the U.S. (
, No. 155), Britain stated that the blockade had been
established to prevent vessels from carrying goods for or coming from
Germany.
52Exclusion zones are distinguished from blockades: W.J. Fenrick,
The Exclusion
Zone Device in the Law ofNaval Warfare
, Canadian Yearbook ofInternational
Law XXIV (1986) 91; Whiteman, 872; L.F.E. Goldie,
Maritime War Zones &
Exclusion Zones
, in H.B. Robertson Jr. (ed.),
The Law ofNaval Operations
(Newport, 1991) 156; J. Schmitt,
72NWP 114M, para. 7.5.2, according to which in those cases they acquire the
character ofan enemy merchant vessel or civil aircraft and may be treated in
accordance with paragraph 8.2.2.
73Kalshoven, 272; G.J.F. van Hegelsom,
Introductory Report
, in W. Heintschel v.
that this paragraph
does, however, prohibit the enforcement solely by weapon
systems, such as mines, unless they are employed in such a manner as not to
endanger legitimate sea-going commerce. In an annotation to paragraph
7.7.2.3, NWP 114M, the authors maintain that the presence ofat least one
surface warship is no longer an absolute requirement to make a blockade legally
effective, as long as other sufficient means are employed.
88The USSR opposed the mining ofHaiphong as interfering with freedom of
navigation, not as a violation ofthe maritime
89OConnell argues that the mining ofHaiphong was a strategic blockadeand
could be maintained and enforced solely by mines. But this is untenable, since
104NWP 114M, paragraph 7.7.3: Similarly, neutral vessels and aircraft engaged
in the carriage ofqualifying reliefsupplies for the civilian population and the
sick and wounded should be authorized to pass through the blockade cordon.
105Bothe, 763; van Hegelsom, 46; Dinstein, 47; Y. Sandoz, in: ICRC, Commentary,
no. 2805;
San Remo manual
, paras. 103 and 104.
San Remo manual
, para. 103.
107Embargoes ordered by the Security Council pursuant to Article 41 require
member states to enforce the respective embargo by all necessary means, i.e.,
the use ofarmed force. By UN Security Council Resolution 217 of20
November 1965, the United Kingdom was entitled to enforce the oil embargo
against Rhodesia. The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq by UNSC
Resolution 661 of6 August 1990 were, according to UNSC Resolution 665 of
25 August 1990, enforced by the states cooperating with Kuwait. In both cases,
the Security Council did not refer to Article 42, but to Article 41 ofthe UN
Charter.
108Annotated Supplement to the
Commanders Handbook on the Law ofNaval
Operations
(Newport, 1997) para. 7.7.2.1, footnote 131.
109For example, in UNSC Resolution 661 of6 August 1990.
110During the second GulfWar, Iran tried to assume a neutral status, but this was
rejected by the vast majority ofstates and international lawyers.
111In Principle 5.2.10 ofthe Helsinki Principles on the Law ofMaritime Neutrality,
the ILA maintains that the Security Council, when acting by virtue ofChapter
VII ofthe Charter, may adopt decisions deviating from this Principle (see
Principle 1.2). Principle 1.2 in part reads as follows: Nothing in the present
Principles shall be construed as implying any limitation upon the powers ofthe
Security Council under Chapters VII and VIII ofthe United Nations Charter.
In particular, no State may rely upon the Principles stated herein in order to
evade obligations laid upon it in pursuance ofa binding decision ofthe Security
Council.In the commentary it is made clear that the provision serves as a
reminder that the principles do not preclude a modification ofthe rules of
neutrality due to the law ofthe United Nations Charter
112W. Heintschel v. Heinegg,
The Current State ofInternational Prize Law
H.H.G. Post (ed.),
(Dordrecht,
5Roger Dufraisse, Rgime douanier, blocus, systme continental: essai de mise au
University Press, 1979) 484. Winfried Baumgart,
The Peace ofParis, 1856
Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio, 1981) 6880.
34Werner E. Mosse,
The Rise and Fall ofthe Crimean System, 18551871
35William Fuller,
Strategy and Power in Russia: 16001917
(New York: Free Press,
Journal ofEconomic History
, December 1981, 896; and Arthur Fremantle,
Three
(New York: John Bradburn, 1864) 10.
4U.S. Treasury Dept,
weiyuanhui, comp.,
Zhongguo lishi dacidian
vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu
chubanshe, 2000) 29.
20Tyler, 79.
21Rawlinson, 190; Tyler, 78.
, 16 March 1895, 31314;
, 23 March 1895, 344;
(Berlin), morning edition, 10
February 1895, 1.
*The thoughts and opinions expressed in this chapter are those ofthe author and
are not necessarily those ofthe U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or
the Naval Historical Center.
1David Trask,
The War with Spain in 1898
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.,
2U.S. Navy Department,
Appendix to the Report ofthe Chiefofthe Bureau of
Navigation, 1898
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1898) 171.
Navy Register, 1 January 1898
4Trask, 82, 86. John D. Alden,
(Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1972) 1234, 3823.
Appendix to the Report ofthe Chiefofthe Bureau ofNavigation
, 547, 856. As the title indicated, the ministers duties included the
invaded regions, that is, those portions ofFrance under German occupation.
Within the ministry, a
Direction du blocus
coordinated matters dealing with
economic warfare. The internal dynamics ofthe French blockade services are
analysed in Marjorie Millbank Farrar,
Conflict and Compromise: The Strategy,
Politics and Diplomacy ofthe French Blockade, 19141918
(The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1974) chapter iii, 3956.
20For the Baltic operations, see Paul G. Halpern,
A Naval History ofWorld War I
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994) chapter vii.
21B.J.C. McKercher and Keith E. Neilson, The Triumph ofUnarmed Forces:
Sweden and the Allied Blockade ofGermany, 19141917,
Journal ofStrategic
38C. Paul Vincent,
The Politics ofHunger: The Allied Blockade ofGermany,
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1985) 446, 4950; Herwig,
First World War
39Offer, 362.
40Gerald D. Feldman,
Army, Industry and Labor in Germany, 19141918
Incident-From the outbreak to the capture ofNanjing), January 1938, Library of
NIDS, 489.
17The Manchurian Railway Information and Research Department,
Kousenryoku chousa hokoku
, (Research Report on the China War Strength: here-
after abbreviated to
), (Tokyo,1940), San ichi Shobo. Reprinted edition,
19According to the declaration, Japan, Manchukuo, and China would establish
respectful, mutual, and indispensable relationships in the fields ofpolitics and
economies and share the task with China for constructing a new order ofEast Asia.
20Memorandum by the Counselor ofEmbassy in Japan (Dooman), 19 November
Foreign Relations ofthe United States, Japan, 19311941
21WHO-NIDS (ed.),
Chugoku homen Kaigun Sakusen 2
, (Imperial Naval
Operations around China vol. 2), 902.
22Southward Advance ofJapanese Expansionist Movement: Hainan and the
37Northern China Merchant Service Association (ed.), Northern China merchant
service Pandect, (Ching-tao, 1942), 426.
38Usui and Inaba (eds),
Gendai-shi siryo 9
39Arthur N. Young,
CHINA and the Helping Hand 19371945
41Kaigun sho kaigun gunji fukyubu, (The Bureau ofNaval Promotion ofthe
Department ofNavy) (ed.),
Shina jihen ni okeru Teikoku kaigun no koudo-sono 2
(The Imperial Naval Actions in the Sino-Part 2), May. 1939, Library ofNIDS,
43Arthur N. Young,
CHINA and the Helping Hand 19371945
44Toa Institute, Economic Development ofOccupied area in China, (Tokyo, Toa
Institute, 1944), 3702.
, 32633. Comparing
with Arthur N. Youngs book, this
report underestimated the Japanese naval blockade on the coastline, especially
the Hong Kong route. It seems to me that this report prompted Japan to go to
war against Britain.
47Yamazawa and Yamamoto,
Long-term economics and statistics, Vol. 14, Boeki to
kokusai syuusi
, (Trade and Economic Balance), (Tokyo, Toyo keizai sinposya,
48WHO-NIDS (ed.),
, (War History Series, Army
Campaigns in the Sino-Japanese Incident, Vol. 3), 1975, 128,
*The thoughts and opinions expressed in this chapter are those ofthe author and
are not necessarily those ofthe UK Joint Services Command and StaffCollege
or any other agency ofthe British Government.
1Alan S. Milward,
15James M. Spaight,
Blockade By Air: the Campaign Against Axis Shipping
(London: Geoffrey Bles, 1942) 42.
50Milward, 115; Speer, 2789, Richard Overy,
Why the Allies Won
Jonathan Cape, 1995) 10133.
51Medlicott, 631.
*The thoughts and opinions expressed in this chapter are those ofthe author and
are not necessarily those ofthe U.S. government, the U.S. Navy Department, or
the Naval War College.
27A New Type ofFormosa Warfare: Reds Spot British Cargo Ships for Chiangs
U.S. News and World Report
, 18 November 1955.
9CINCPAC Interim Evaluation Report No. 5, 1 July 195231 January 1953,
2000) 406; William Taubman,
Khrushchev: The Man and His Era
(New York:
W.W. Norton, 2003) 542.
7Carlos Lechuga,
Cuba and the Missile Crisis
, trans. Mary Todd (New York:
Ocean Press, 2001) 10;
FRUS
8Dmitri Volkogonov,
Autopsy for an Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the
, 17886; Stern provides a somewhat different wording ofthe Presidents
first sentence. Stern, 128.
28McAuliffe, Document 65, 208.
FRUS
30For Kennedys comments, see
, 134. For his direction to Sorensen, see Stern, 136.
FRUS
Stern, 3689; McGeorge Bundy,
Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in
the First Fifty Years
(New York: Random House, 1988) 4323.
53Dobrynin, 868; Stern, 3712.
54Taubman,
Khrushchev: The Man and His Era
FRUS
report was prepared by the Mine Warfare Project Office for the ChiefofNaval
Operations.
9Spencer C. Tucker,
8Memorandum, Briefs for New Government, June 1970 Briefno. 27: Beira
Patrol, DEFE 24/588
9Message, Flag Officer, Middle East to HMS
Rhyl
Lowestoft
February 1966, CAB 164/26.
10Memorandum, J.O. Wright to MOD, 11 March 1966, CAB 164/26. A message
from the Commonwealth Relations Offices to the embassy in Nairobi, Kenya,
specified two conditions: flag-state permission and no serious risk ofloss of
life. Commonwealth Relations Office message dated 11 March 1966, PREM
11Good, 136.
12Law Officers Department memorandum to Prime Minister, 7 April 1966, CAB
164/68. Message from Commonwealth Relations Office to British High
Commissions, 7 April 1966, PREM, 13/1139.
13British UN mission to Foreign Office, 9 April 1966, PREM 13/1140.
15Memorandum, Passage ofa Tanker from Durban to Beira inside Territorial
Waters, Naval Intelligence to Prime Minister, 14 April 1966, PREM 13/1140.
4Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse,
Signals ofWar: The
Falklands Conflict of1982
3Although the Min MIF formally stands for Maritime, a frequent alternative
usage has been Multinational.
4Juan Carlos Neves, Interoperability in Multinational Coalitions: Lessons from
the Persian GulfWar,
Naval War College Review
, Winter 1995, vol. LXVIII,
5Ken Doolan The GulfChallenge, in David Stevens (ed.)
Maritime Power in the
15Commodore James Goldrick, RAN, In Command in the Gulf,
Naval Institute Proceedings
, December 2002, vol. 128, No 12, 40.
16David Horner,
Making the Australian Defence Force
, Volume IV of
The Australian
Centenary History ofDefence
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001) 235.
17Rana Sabbagh, Western Warships Tighten Iraq Sanctions Noose,
Reuters
,3 August 1992, Factiva Document lba0000020011123do8302lky.
18Cortright and Lopez, 34.
19Cordesman, 59.
20Scott Ritter, The Case for Iraqs Qualitative Disarmament,
Arms Control
Today
, vol. 30, No. 5, June 2000, 8.
21John Mueller and Karl Mueller, Sanctions ofMass Destruction,
Foreign
Affairs
, May/June 1999, 4353.
22For example, the Kuwaiti seizure on 13 August 1999 ofa dhow loaded with
nearly 250 tons ofmixed cargo, including baby feeding bottles, talcum powder,
and cotton wool. Kuwait impounds ship it claims held illegal exports from
Iraq,
Agence France-Presse
report of16 August 1999. Factiva Document
afpr00000200110825dv8g02kn2.
23Maritime Embargo against Iraq ineffective: French Commander,
Agence
France-Presse
report of15 October 1998. Factiva Document afpr0000200109
Dow Jones International News
, Warship Captain Calls Iraq Sanctions
Unenforceable,
Dow Jones News
8 April 1995, Factiva Document dji00000200
25U.S. Intercepts Ship Tanker Thought to be Smuggling Oil,
Dayton Daily News
14 October 1994, Factiva Document ddnw000020011030dqae003he.
26John Prescott, Iranians Seize Up to 30 Ships in Persian Gulf,
Lloyds List
, 17 March 1995, Factiva Document ll00000020011103dr3h009yo.
27SharifImam-Jomeh, Iran says ships fly its flag to beat Iraq embargo,
Reuters
, 28 June 1994, Factiva Document lba0000020030219dq6s01k1i; see also
BBC Monitoring Middle East, Iranian Navy intercepts vessels carrying goods
destined for Iraq,
29 November 1998. Factiva Document bbcmep00200
28Cortright and Lopez, 33.
29Iraq: Response to Illegal Oil Smuggling Sought,
EuropaWorld
, 11 January
30Gulfforces seize seven ships in May with Iraqi oil,
May 2002, Factiva Document platt00020030719dy5v01ikc.
32Nissar Hoath, Seized Ships Reduced to Scrap,
GulfNews
, 26 June 2002,
Factiva Document mewgun0020020725dy6q00003.
33Platts Gulfforces seize
34Goldrick, In Command
35Ripley, Middle East maritime
36Persian Gulf,
Platts Oilgram News
, 19 July 2002, Factiva Document
pon0000020020815dy7j0006w.
37Max Blenkin, Australia stands firm on Iraqi ship searches,
Australian Associated
Press General News
, 1 August 2002, Factiva Document aap0000020020
801dy81003ef. See also Captain P.D. Jones, RAN, Maritime Interception
Operations Screen Commander in the Gulf Part I Operation
Journal ofthe Australian Naval Institute
, No. 109, Winter 2003, 25.
38Captain P.D Jones, RAN, Maritime Interception Operations Screen
Commander in the Gulf Part II Operations
Falconer
Journal of
the Australian Naval Institute
, No. 110, Spring 2003, 13.
39Cortright and Lopez, 34.
6Julian Baum, Politics Is Local,
Far Eastern Economic Review
7Patrick E. Tyler, As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens,
York Times
, 24 January 1996.
8See What If?,
, 9 March 1996, 26.
9Patrick E. Tyler, Beijing Steps Up Military Pressure on Taiwan Leader,
York Times
, 7 March 1996.
10Three ofthe four launches were shown on Chinese television. See Patrick E.
Tyler, China Says Maneuvers Will Last through Taiwans Elections,
New York
, 16 March 1996.
11Patrick E. Tyler, China Warns U.S. to Stay Out ofTaiwan Feud,
New York
, 12 March 1996.
12Tyler, China Says Maneuvers
13Just Playing?,
, 23 March 1996, 24.
14U.S. Ships Monitor RecklessFirings,
South China Morning Post
, 10 March
1996; Michael Richardson, Asia Looks to U.S. to Protect Trade Routes around
Taiwan,
International Herald Tribune
, 14 March 1996.
15China/Taiwan/Cargo2: Could Experience Delays,
Dow Jones International
, 5 March 1996.
16Oil Shipments to Taiwan Not Affected by Missile Tests,
Platts Oilgram Price
Report
, 11 March 1996; Port Operations Normal at Taiwans Keelung,
Kaohsiung,
Platts Oilgram Price Report
, 14 March 1996.
17James Brewer, Shipping Ordered to Avoid Test Area,
Lloyds List
, 9 March 1996; Japanese Shipping Companies Very Concerned
about ChinaTaiwan Tensions,
Agence France-Presse
, 12 March 1996.
18Air, Sea Traffic Unaffected by Chinese Missile Tests,
BBC Monitoring Service:
Asia Pacific
, 9 March 1996.
19Taiwan Says 300 Flights to Alter Route Daily,
Reuters
, 10 March 1996.
20Bunker Fuel Seen Rising amid China/Taiwan Tensions,
Reuters
, 12 March 1996.
21TaiwanChina Tension Seen Boosting Shipping Costs,
Reuters
, 11 March 1996.
22Fisher, Chinas Missiles
23See David Lague, Revealed: U.S. Plan to Save Taiwan,
The Sydney Morning
Herald
, 8 March 1996.
24Bad Weather Hampers Chinese Exercises in Northern Taiwan Strait,
Agence
France-Presse
, 20 March 1996.
25Eric McVadon, PRC Exercises, Doctrine and Tactics toward Taiwan, in Lilley
and Downs,
Crisis in the Taiwan Strait
,251.
26Communist Tantrums Hurt Hong Kongs Transportation, Stocks,
Taiwan
, 12 March 1996.
27Mainland Transportation Sectors Victims ofMilitary Exercises,
Taiwan
, 21 March 1996.
28Andrew Scobell,
Chinas Use ofForce: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long
March
, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ch. 8.
29Julian Baum
33Japan Defense Agency, The New Guidelines for JapanU.S. Defense
Cooperation, c. 1998, 12.
34Mark A. Stokes, Chinas Military Space and Conventional Theater Missile
Development: Implications for Security in the Taiwan Strait, in Susan M. Puska
Peoples Liberation Army after Next
, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, Carlisle, PA, August 2000, 149 (original emphasis).
Janes Strategic Weapon Systems
, Issue 34, Janes Information Group, Coulsdon,
Surrey, 2001, 423.
36U.S. Department ofDefense, The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait, Report
to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 1999, Part IV.
37Jeremy Stocker, Missile Defense at Sea: Options for Taiwan, in Martin
Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (eds),
Taiwans Maritime Security
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
38It has also been alleged that China may have hired organized criminal syndicates
to infiltrate Taiwan to assassinate political candidates. See Garver,
Face Off
39Wei-Ming Ma, Cyber-threats to Maritime Trade and Port Infrastructure, in
Andrew Forbes (ed.),
The Strategic Importance ofSeaborne Trade and Shipping:
A Common Interest ofAsia Pacific
, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No.
10, RAN Sea Power Centre, RAAF Fairbairn, Canberra, 2003.
40Garver, 1256.
41Beijing Warns ofTaiwan DisasterIfIt Declares Independence,
Agence
France-Presse
, 9 March 1996.
42Porch, The Taiwan Strait Crisis of1996, 403.
43The
Sovremenny
7K. Beazly,
biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, U.S. Department ofDefense
Dictionary ofMilitary and Associated Terms.
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
, vol. XII, no. 4. (1895), 856.
5In October 2001 a suspected al Qaeda terrorist was apprehended at a port in
southern Italy in a container bound for Canada. He had provisions for a long
Bane, Suda L. and Ralph H. Lutz (eds).
The Blockade ofGermany after the
Armistice, 19181919: Selected Documents ofthe Supreme Economic Council,
Superior Blockade Council, American ReliefAdministration, and Other Wartime
Organizations
. New York: Howard Fertig, 1972.
Barker, Ralph.
The Blockade Busters
. London: Chatto & Windus, 1976.
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The Naval Blockade: A Study ofFactors Necessary for Effec-
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The Law ofBlockade: Its History, Present Condition, and Probable
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The Law ofBlockade as Contained in the Report ofEight Cases Argued
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Never Caught: Personal Adventures Connected with
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The Virginia Campaign and the Blockade and Siege ofYorktown,
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9/11 24043
25 de Mayo
23031
23334
Admiral Hardy
al-Aqabah 202, 205, 206, 212
Al Wasitti
Aleksandrovsk
Alekseyev, Aleksandr 157
Alferez Sobral
Alkire, Brigadier-General Darr H. 152
Almirante Oquendo
Alsterufer
Altmark
American Civil War
Civil War
American Journal ofInternational Law
Amuriyah
Anderson, Quartermaster 8889
Anderson, Admiral George W., Jr. 160,
Argentina: Falklands War 7, 189200,
261; Iraq 202, 203
Artois
Atlantic Causeway
Atlantic Conveyor
Atomiya, Lieutenant-General Jun 111
Australia: graunching 204; Iraq 202,
Australian maritime border protection
8, 225, 23435; background 225
28; effectiveness 165, 263, 264; enemy
adaptation 260; force 255; goals 257,
258; new regime 22831; opera-
tional experience 23134; space 253;
Austria 1213, 56
Austria-Hungary 9495, 103
Bahia Paraiso
Ball, George 160
ballistic missiles 21523
Baltic Sea: Crimean War 5, 4952;
World War I 98
Baltimore 35, 40, 44
Banks, Commander Norman 23334
Barrie, Admiral Chris 228
Bay ofPigs 157
Beira patrol
Brooklyn
Brownson, Commander W.H. 90
Bucharest
Bulloch, James 69
Bundy, McGeorge 159, 160
Bunker Hill
Bynkershoek, Cornelius van 11
Caillard, Antoine-Bernard 26
Cmara y Libermoore, Rear-Admiral
Manuel 89
Canada: blockade law 1617; Iraq 202,
203, 205; War of1812 36, 37, 39, 44
Canberra
Cap Norte
Carlsons Canyon 151
Carter, General 160
Castro, Fidel 157
Cervera, Admiral Pascual 83, 8587, 88
Champlain, Lake 35, 44
Charleston 62, 64
Chesapeake
Chesapeake Bay 36, 39, 4042, 4344
Chiang Kai-shek: Nationalistsblockade
ofPRC 134, 141; second Sino-
Japanese War 105, 106, 108, 109, 115
China: first Sino-Japanese War 5, 71
79; Korean War 67, 14555;
second Sino-Japanese War 6, 105
258; negotiating an end to the crisis
16365; running the quarantine
16163; space 253, 254; time 251,
Dalian 13334
Davis, Jefferson 67
De Chair, Rear-Admiral Dudley 93
Declaration ofLondon 1315, 16, 18,
Declaration ofParis 5, 1213, 5758,
Delaware Bay 39, 40
Denmark 12; continental blockade 27,
31; Crimean War 48; Iraq 202, 203;
shipping in China 113; World War I
99; World War II 125
Dennison, Admiral Robert L. 161, 163
Dillon, C. Douglas 160
Ding Ruchang, Admiral 71, 72, 73, 74
distant blockades 252
Dobrynin, Anatoly 163, 165
Dolmatovo
Douglas-Home, Sir Alec 187
droit de suite 1112, 14
Dulles, John Foster 141
Dundas, Vice-Admiral Sir James 52, 54
Dundas, Rear-Admiral Sir Richard 51
duration 250, 251, 252, 256
economic blockades 10
effectiveness 12, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 243,
250; strategic and operational 251,
252, 26265
Eisenhower, President 141
embargo 4, 250
Emperator Carlos V
Encyclopedia ofAmerican Foreign Policy,
Endsweep
enemy adaptation 250, 25962
Enemy Experts Committee 97
enforcement 24648, 254, 256
Essex
Falklands War 7, 189, 199200;
Argentinian seizure 19192; back-
ground 18991; British response
19294; effect ofblockade 19799;
effectiveness 262, 263, 264, 265;
enemy adaptation 260, 261; force 255,
256; goals 257, 258; impact ofnaval
blockade 19497; space 252, 253;
far blockades 252, 253
Fearless
Ferrell, Robert xix
fictitious blockades 1113
Forbes, Admiral Sir Charles 122
force 250, 25456, 258
France: blockade law 1213; conti-
nental blockade 3, 4, 12, 2533;
Crimean War 5, 46, 47, 48, 52, 54, 56,
57; Iraq 202, 203, 208; second Sino-
Japanese War 109, 110; shipping in
China 113; War of1812 37, 45;
World War I 91, 9495, 9798;
World War II 117, 123, 124
Fraunces, Michael 240, 249
Freeman, Chas 217
Freidman, Norman 246
Gagarin
Game Warden
169, 17273
General Belgrano
192, 19495, 196
Geneva Convention 10, 20
Germany: blockade law 1617; ship-
ping in China 113; World War I 3, 5,
91103; World War II 3, 6, 11730,
Giap, Vo Nguyen 170, 174
Gilpatric, Roswell L. 160
goals 250, 257, 25859
Gorgas, Brigadier-General Josiah 61,
GrafZeppelin
Graham, Sir James 4748, 49, 51
graunching 204
Great Britain
Greece 46, 184, 202, 203
Gribkov, General 158
Groener, General 118
Grotius, Hugo 11
Guantnamo Bay 87
Guerriere
GulfofAden 203
GulfofOman 203, 205
GulfWar (1991) 205
GulfWar (2003) 212, 213
Index
Hague Convention VIII 13, 18
Haiphong 1819, 17477, 178, 179,
Hamburg 26, 27, 2930, 32
Hamelin, Admiral Francoise-Adolphe
Hanover 26, 32
Harding, J.D. 48, 5051, 54
Hasegawa, Vice-Admiral Kiyoshi 106,
Healey, Denis 185
Heath, Edward 187
Heath, J.M. 193
Herbert, Hilary A. 7172
Heyser, Major Richard S. 159
Hipper, Rear-Admiral Franz von 100
Hitler, Adolf11819
Ho Chi Minh Trail 170
14749; China 142; effectiveness
262, 263, 264, 265; enemy adaptation
260, 262; force 255, 256; from
Strangle
Saturate
15254; goals
257, 258, 259; Operation
Strangle
aerial blockade 14952; space 252,
253, 254; and Taiwan 138; time 251
Kuwait 201, 212, 213
Cuban Missile Crisis 261, 7, 15767;
first Sino-Japanese War 71, 78;
Korean War 10, 147; Nationalists
blockade ofPRC 133, 135, 142;
second Sino-Japanese War 6, 113
Taiwan 8, 265; Chinese blockade strategy
3, 21523,
Nationalists
blockade ofPRC
Taluei
Tampa
22728, 231
Taylor, General Maxwell 160, 161
technology 34, 24349, 265;
Falklands War 19899
Temps, Le
7778
Texas 62
Texas
Thieu, Nguyen Van 178
Thompson, Llewellyn E. 160
tight blockades 262, 263
time 25052
Tirpitz, Admiral Alfred von 100101
Tobruck
total blockades 258
Tracy, Nicholas 249
Treaty ofGhent 35, 44
Treaty ofParis 46
Trenholm, George 66
Troyanovsky, Oleg 163
Truman, Harry S. 138, 145
Tupper, Vice-Admiral Reginald 93
Turkey 1213; Crimean War 46, 47, 57;
and Iraq 213; US missiles 158, 164
65, 167; World War I 9596
Uganda
UN: Iraq 8, 2012, 205, 206, 207, 208,
210, 212; Korean War 138, 14555;
Rhodesia 18486, 188,
UN Charter: Article 42 11; Article 51
194; Chapter VII 2122, 184, 273n
United Arab Emirates 210
United Kingdom 254; blockade law 12
13, 13, 1516; continental blockade
3, 4, 12, 2533, 262; Crimean War 5,
4659; Falklands War 7, 189200;
Iraq 202, 203, 204, 209, 210; Korean
War 147; Nationalistsblockade of
PRC 13436, 137, 140, 142;
Rhodesia 7, 18188; second Sino-
Japanese War 109, 11011; shipping
in China 108, 11213; War of1812
45, 3545; World War I 3, 5, 91
103; World War II 3, 6, 20, 11730
United States 254, 264; blockade law
1617, 19; Chinas anti-Taiwan
blockade strategy 8, 216, 218, 219,
220, 222, 223; continental blockade
15767; Declaration ofParis 57, 58;
first Sino-Japanese War 78; impact of
9/11 9, 240, 24142, 248; Iraq 201,
2023, 204, 205, 209, 210, 211;
Korean War 67, 14555;
Nationalistsblockade ofPRC 133,
136, 13941; second Sino-Japanese
War 109, 111, 115, 116; Spanish-
Weihaiwei 5, 71, 7274, 77
Wellington, Duke of41
Wilmington 62, 64
Wilson, Harold 182, 183, 186, 294n
Winslow
Wise, Stephen R. 61
Wonsan 14749
Wood, Sir Charles 57
World War I 5, 1415, 91, 103, 239;
blockades effectiveness 1013, 262,
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